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Revelations of
PRINCE

LICHNOWSKY

PRICE 10 CENTS

PUBLISHED BY
CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE
The Monthly of The New York Times Company

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
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LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM

Full Text of the Suppressed Document Written by
the Man Who Was German Ambassador in
London When the War Began

Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador to Great Britain at the outbreak of the war, is the author of a secret memorandum entitled "My London Mission, 1912-1914," which was intended only for his private family archives, but which became public in March, 1918, creating a profound sensation in Germany.

The document was written in 1916 at the Prince's country seat in Silesia. It relates Lichnowsky's experiences as intermediary between the German and British Governments during the crucial period leading up to the war, and its historical importance is due largely to its revelations of Germany's actions in precipitating the crisis. Through channels described elsewhere in these pages, a copy of Lichnowsky's memorandum reached a newspaper in Stockholm, the Politiken, which published it in part. Other parts appeared in Berlin and Munich newspapers. The various parts were assembled by The New York Times and by the Current History Magazine of The New York Times Co., and the memorandum is herewith presented in its entirety, along with the full



PRINCE LICHNOWSKY

text of the reply made by Herr von Jagow, who was German Foreign Minister at the time. The corroborative evidence of Dr. Muehlon, former Krupp Director, with other matter, is also presented. Prince Lichnowsky was deprived of his rank when his memorandum became public. On April 27 the Prussian upper house decided to grant the request of the First State Attorney of District Court No. 1 of Berlin, authorizing him to begin criminal proceedings against the Prince "for infringing the secrecy of documents officially intrusted to him." Prince Lich-

nowsky in the meantime is virtually a prisoner on his estate in Silesia. Captain Beerfelde, a member of the German General Staff, who was concerned in giving publicity to the Prince's memorandum, was arrested early in April on the charge that in aiding in the distribution of these documents he had been guilty of treason.

Text of the Memorandum

Kuchelna, 16 August, 1916.

BARON MARSCHALL died in September, 1912, having held his post in London for a few months only.

His appointment, which was due mainly to his age and the plotting of a younger man to get to London, was one of the many mistakes made by our Foreign Office. In spite of his imposing personality and great reputation, he was too old and tired to be able to adapt himself to a purely foreign and Anglo-Saxon milieu. He was more of a bureaucrat and a lawyer than a diplomat or statesman. He set to work to convince Englishmen of the harmless character of our fleet, and naturally succeeded in strengthening an entirely opposite impression.

To my great surprise I was offered the post in October. After many years' work I had withdrawn to the country, as no suitable post had been found for me, and I spent my time on my farm and in my garden, on horseback and in the fields, but I read industriously and published occasional political articles. Thus eight years passed, and thirteen since I had left Vienna as Ambassador. That was actually my last political employment. I do not know to whom my appointment in London was due. At all events, not to his Majesty, as I did not belong to his immediate set, although he was always gracious to me. I know by experience that his candidates were frequently successfully opposed. As a matter of fact, Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter wanted to send Baron von Stumm to London. He met me at once with undisguised ill-will, and tried to frighten me by rudeness. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg was amiable to me, and had visited me shortly before at Grätz. I am, therefore, inclined to think that they settled on me, as no other candidate was available. Had Baron von Marschall not

died, it is unlikely that I should have been dug out any more than in previous years. The moment was obviously favorable for an attempt to come to a better understanding with England.

THE MOROCCO QUESTION

Our obscure policy in Morocco had repeatedly caused distrust of our peaceful intention, or, at least, had raised doubts as to whether we knew what we wanted or whether our intention was to keep Europe in a state of suspense and, on occasion, to humiliate the French. An Austrian colleague, who was a long time in Paris, said to me: "The French had begun to forget *la revanche*. You have regularly reminded them of it by tramping on their toes." After we had declined Delcassé's offer to come to an agreement regarding Morocco, and then solemnly declared that we had no political interest there—an attitude which agreed with Bismarckian political conditions—we suddenly discovered in Abdul Aziz a Kruger Number Two. To him also, as to the Boers, we promised the protection of the mighty German Empire, and with the same result. Both manifestations concluded, as they were bound to conclude, with a retraction, if we were not prepared to start a world war. The pitiable conference of Algeciras could alter nothing, and still less cause Delcassé's fall. Our attitude furthered the Russo-Japanese and Russo-British rapprochement. In face of "the German peril" all other considerations faded into the background. The possibility of another Franco-German war had been patent, and, as had not been the case in 1870, such a war could not leave out Russia or England.

The valuelessness of the Triple Alliance had already been demonstrated at Algeciras, and, immediately afterward, the equal worthlessness of the

agreements made there when the Sultanate fell to pieces, which was, of course, unavoidable. Meanwhile, the belief was spreading among the Russian people that our foreign policy was weak and was breaking down under "encirclement," and that cowardly surrender followed on haughty gestures. It is to the credit of von Kiderlen-Wächter, though otherwise overrated as a statesman, that he cleared up the Moroccan situation and adapted himself to circumstances which could not be altered. Whether the world had to be upset by the Agadir coup is a question I do not touch. This event was hailed with joy in Germany, but in England caused all the more uneasiness in that the British Government waited in vain for three weeks for a statement of our intentions. Mr. Lloyd George's Mansion House speech, intended to warn us, was a consequence. Before Delcassé's fall and before the Algeciras conference we could have obtained harbors and bases on the West Coast, but that was no longer possible.

ENGLAND SOUGHT AGREEMENT

When I came to London in November, 1912, people had become easier about the question of Morocco, especially since an agreement had been reached with France and Berlin. Lord Haldane's mission had failed, it is true, as we demanded promises of neutrality instead of contenting ourselves with a treaty which would insure us against a British attack or any attack with British support. Sir Edward Grey had not, meanwhile, given up the idea of coming to an understanding with us, and made such an attempt first on economic and colonial grounds. Through the agency of that qualified and expert Counselor of Embassy, von Kühlmann, an exchange of opinions had taken place with regard to the renewal of the Portuguese colonial treaty and the Bagdad Railway, which thus carried out the unexpected aim of dividing into spheres of interest both the above-mentioned colonies and Asia Minor. The British statesman, old points in dispute both with France and Russia having been settled, wished to come to a similar agreement with us. His intention was not to isolate us but

to make us in so far as possible partners in a working concern. Just as he had succeeded in bridging Franco-British and Russo-British difficulties, so he wished as far as possible to remove German-British difficulties, and by a network of treaties—which would finally include an agreement on the miserable fleet question—to secure the peace of the world, as our earlier policy had lent itself to a co-operation with the Entente, which contained a mutual assurance against the danger of war.

GREY'S DESIRES

This was Sir Edward Grey's program in his own words: "Without infringing on the existing friendly relations with France and Russia, which in themselves contained no aggressive elements, and no binding obligations for England; to seek to achieve a more friendly rapprochement with Germany, and to bring the two groups nearer together."

In England, as with us, there were two opinions, that of the optimists, who believed in an understanding, and that of the pessimists, who considered war inevitable sooner or later. Among the former were Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Haldane, and most of the Ministers in the Radical Cabinet, as well as leading Liberal organs, such as *The Westminster Gazette*, *The Manchester Guardian*, and *The Daily Chronicle*. To the pessimists belong especially Conservative politicians like Mr. Balfour, who repeatedly made his meaning clear to me; leading soldiers such as Lord Roberts, who insisted on the necessity of conscription, and on "the writing on the wall," and, further, the Northcliffe press, and that leading English journalist, Mr. Garvin of *The Observer*. During my term of office they abstained from all attacks and took up, personally and politically, a friendly attitude. Our naval policy and our attitude in the years 1905, 1908, and 1911 had, nevertheless, caused them to think that it might one day come to war. Just as with us, the former are now dubbed shortsighted and simple-minded, while the latter are regarded as the true prophets.

The first Balkan war led to the collapse

of Turkey and with it the defeat of our policy, which had been identified with Turkey for many years. Since the salvation of Turkey in Europe was no longer feasible, only two possibilities for settling the question remained. Either we declared we had no longer any interest in the definition of boundaries in the Balkan Peninsula, and left the settlement of the question to the Balkan peoples themselves, or we supported our allies and carried out a Triple Alliance policy in the East, thereby giving up the rôle of mediator.

I urged the former course from the beginning, but the German Foreign Office very much preferred the latter. The chief question was Albania. Our allies desired the establishment of an independent State of Albania, as Austria would not allow Serbia to reach the Adriatic, and Italy did not wish the Greeks to reach Valona or even the territory north of Corfu. On the other hand, Russia, as is known, favored Serbian, and France Greek, desires. My advice was now to consider the question as outside the alliance, and to support neither Austrian nor Italian wishes. Without our support the establishment of Albania, whose incapability of existence might have been foreseen, was an impossibility. Serbia would have pushed forward to the coast; then the present world war would have been avoided. France and Italy would have remained definitely divided as to Greece, and the Italians, had they not wished to fight France alone, would have been obliged to consent to the expansion of Greece to the district north of Durazzo. The greater part of civilized Albania is Greek. The southern towns are entirely Greek, and, at the time of the conference of Ambassadors, deputations from the larger towns came to London to carry through the annexation to Greece.

In Greece today whole groups are Albanian, and the so-called Greek national dress is of Albanian origin. The amalgamation of the preponderating Orthodox and Islamic Albanians with the Greek State was, therefore, the best solution and the most natural, if one leaves out of account Scutari and the northern part of Serbia and Montenegro.

His Majesty was also in favor of this solution on dynastic grounds. When I encouraged the monarch by letter to this effect, I received violent reproaches from the Chancellor for supporting Austria's opponents, and he forbade all such interference in the future, and even direct correspondence. We had eventually, however, to abandon the tradition of carrying out the Triple Alliance policy in the East and to acknowledge our mistake, which consisted in identifying ourselves with the Turks in the south and the Austro-Magyars in the north; for the continuance of that policy, which we began at the Congress in Berlin and subsequently carried on zealously, was bound in time, should the necessary skill in conducting it fail, to lead to a collision with Russia and a world war.

TURKEY, RUSSIA, ITALY

Instead of uniting with Russia on the basis of the independence of the Sultan, whom the Russians also did not wish to drive out of Constantinople, and confining ourselves to economic interests in the East, while at the same time refraining from all military and political interference and being satisfied with a division of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, the goal of our political ambition was to dominate in the Bosphorus. In Russia, therefore, the opinion arose that the way to Constantinople and to the Mediterranean lay through Berlin. Instead of encouraging a powerful development in the Balkan States, which were once free and are very different from the Russians, of which fact we have already had experience, we placed ourselves on the side of the Turkish and Magyar oppressors. The dire mistake of our Triple Alliance and our Eastern policies, which drove Russia—our natural friend and best neighbor—into the arms of France and England, and kept her from her policy of Asiatic expansion, was the more evident, as a Franco-Russian attack, the only hypothesis justifying a Triple Alliance policy, had to be eliminated from our calculations.

As to the value of the alliance with Italy, one word only. Italy needs our money and our tourists after the war,

with or without our alliance. That our alliance would go by the board in the event of war was to be foreseen. The alliance, consequently, was worthless.

Austria, however, needed our protection both in war and peace, and had no other point d'appui. This dependence on us is based on political, national, and economic grounds, and is all the greater in proportion to the intimacy of our relations with Russia. This was proved in the Bosnian crisis. Since Count Beust, no Vienna Minister had been so self-conscious with us as Count Aehrenthal was during the last years of his life. Under the influence of a properly conducted German policy which would keep us in touch with Russia, Austria-Hungary is our vassal, and is tied to us even without an alliance and without reciprocal services; under the influence of a misguided policy, however, we are tied to Austria-Hungary. An alliance would therefore be purposeless.

I know Austria far too well not to know that a return to the policy of Count Felix Schwarzenberg or to that of Count Moritz Esterhazy was unthinkable. Little as the Slavs living there love us, they wish just as little for a return to the German Kaiserdom, even with a Hapsburg-Lorraine at its head. They are striving for an internal Austrian federation on a national basis, a condition which is even less likely of realization within the German Empire than under the Double Eagle. Austro-Germans look on Berlin as the centre of German power and Kultur, and they know that Austria can never be a leading power. They desire as close a connection as possible with the empire, but not to the extent of an anti-German policy.

BALKAN QUARRELS

Since the seventies the conditions have changed fundamentally in Austria, and also, perhaps, in Bavaria. Just as here a return to Pan-German particularism and the old Bavarian policy is not to be feared, so there a revival of the policy of Prince Kaunitz and Prince Schwarzenberg is not to be contemplated. But by a constitutional union with Austria, which even without Galicia and Dalmatia is

inhabited at least to the extent of one-half by non-Germans, our interests would suffer; while, on the other hand, by the subordination of our policy to the point of view of Vienna and Budapest, we should have to "epouser les querelles de l'Autriche."

We, therefore, had no need to heed the desires of our allies. They were not only unnecessary but dangerous, inasmuch as they would lead to a collision with Russia if we looked at Eastern questions through Austrian eyes. The transformation of our alliance with its single original purpose into a complete alliance, involving a complexity of common interests, was calculated to call forth the very state of things which the constitutional negotiations were designed to prevent, namely, war. Such a policy of alliances would, moreover, entail the loss of the sympathies of the young, strong, and growing communities in the Balkan Peninsula, which were ready to turn to us and open their market to us. The contrast between dynastic and democratic ideas had to be given clear expression, and, as usual, we stood on the wrong side. King Carol told one of our representatives that he had made an alliance with us on condition that we retained control of affairs, but that if that control passed to Austria it would entirely change the basis of affairs, and under those conditions he could no longer participate. Matters stood in the same position in Serbia, where against our own economic interests we were supporting an Austrian policy of strangulation.

BACKED WRONG HORSES

We had always backed horses which, it was evident, would lose, such as Kruger, Abdul Aziz, Abdul Hamid, Wilhelm of Wied, and finally—and this was the most miserable mistake of all—Count Berchtold.

Shortly after my arrival in London, in 1912, Sir Edward Grey proposed an informal exchange of views in order to prevent a European war developing out of the Balkan war, since, at the outbreak of that war, we had unfortunately declined the proposal of the French Gov-

ernment to join in a declaration of disinterestedness and impartiality on the part of the powers. The British statesman maintained from the beginning that England had no interest in Albania, and would, therefore, not go to war on the subject. In his rôle of "honest broker" he would confine his efforts to mediation and an attempt to smooth away difficulties between the two groups. He, therefore, by no means placed himself on the side of the Entente Powers, and during the negotiations, which lasted about eight months, he lent his good-will and powerful influence toward the establishment of an understanding. Instead of adopting the English point of view, we accepted that dictated to us by Vienna. Count Mensdorff led the Triple Alliance in London and I was his second.

GREY ALWAYS CONCILIATORY

My duty was to support his proposals. The clever and experienced Count Szogyenyi was at the helm in Berlin. His refrain was "*casus foederis*," and when once I dared to doubt the justice of this phrase I was seriously warned against Austrophobism. Referring to my father, it was even said that I had inherited it. On every point, including Albania, the Serbian harbors in the Adriatic, Scutari, and in the definition of the Albanian frontiers, we were on the side of Austria and Italy, while Sir Edward Grey hardly ever took the French or Russian point of view. On the contrary, he nearly always took our part in order to give no pretext for war—which was afterward brought about by a dead Archduke. It was with his help that King Nicholas was induced to leave Scutari. Otherwise there would have been war over this matter, as we should never have dared to ask "our allies" to make concessions.

Sir Edward Grey conducted the negotiations with care, calm, and tact. When a question threatened to become involved he proposed a formula which met the case and always secured consent. He acquired the full confidence of all the representatives.

Once again we had successfully withstood one of the many threats against

the strength characterizing our policy. Russia had been obliged to give way to us all along the line, as she never got an opportunity to advance Serbian wishes. Albania was set up as an Austrian vassal State, and Serbia was driven away from the sea. The conference was thus a fresh humiliation for Russia.

As in 1878 and 1908, we had opposed the Russian program without German interests being brought into play. Bismarck had to minimize the mistake of the Congress by a secret treaty, and his attitude in the Battenberg question—the downward incline being taken by us in the Bosnian question—was followed up in London, and was not given up, with the result that it led to the abyss.

The dissatisfaction then prevalent in Russia was given vent to during the London Conference by an attack in the Russian press on my Russian colleague and on Russian diplomacy.

His German origin and Catholic faith, his reputation as a friend of Germany, and the accident that he was related both to Count Mensdorff and to myself were all made use of by dissatisfied parties. Although not a particularly important personality, Count Benckendorff possessed many qualities of a good diplomat—tact, worldly knowledge, experience, an agreeable personality, and a natural eye for men and things. He sought always to avoid provocative attitudes, and was supported by the attitude of England and France.

I once said: "The feeling in Russia is very anti-German." He replied: "There are also many strong influential pro-German circles there. But the people generally are anti-Austrian."

It only remains to be added that our exaggerated Austrophilism is not exactly likely to break up the Entente and turn Russia's attention to her Asiatic interests.

PRE-WAR DIPLOMACY

[The next passages, which had formerly been suppressed by the Swedish Government, appeared in the *Politiken* of Stockholm on March 26:]

At the same time (1913) the Balkan Conference met in London, and I had the opportunity of meeting the leading men

of the Balkan States. The most important personage among them was M. Venizelos. He was anything but anti-German, and particularly prized the Order of the Red Eagle, which he even wore at the French Embassy. With his winning amiability and *savoir faire* he could always win sympathy.

Next to him a great rôle was played by Daneff, the then Bulgarian Prime Minister and Count Berchtold's confidant. He gave the impression of being a capable and energetic man, and even the influence of his friends at Vienna and Budapest, at which he sometimes laughed, was attributable to the fact that he had let himself be drawn into the second Balkan war and had declined Russian intervention.

M. Take Jonescu was often in London, too, and visited me regularly. I had known him since the time when I was Secretary at Bucharest. He was also one of Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter's friends. His aim in London was to secure concessions for Rumania by negotiations with M. Daneff. In this he was supported by the most capable Rumanian Minister, M. Misu. That these negotiations were stranded by the Bulgarian opposition is known. Count Berchtold—and naturally we with him—was entirely on the side of Bulgaria; otherwise we should have succeeded by pressure on M. Daneff in obtaining the desired satisfaction for the Rumanians and have bound Rumania to us, as she was by Austria's attitude in the second Balkan war, while afterward she was estranged from the Central Powers.

AUSTRIA'S PRESTIGE INJURED

Bulgaria's defeat in the second Balkan war and Serbia's victory, as well as the Rumanian advance, naturally constituted a reproach to Austria. The idea of equalizing this by military intervention in Serbia seems to have gained ground rapidly in Vienna. This is proved by the Italian disclosure, and it may be presumed that the Marquis di San Giuliano, who described the plan as a "*pericolosissima avventura*," (an extremely risky adventure,) saved us from a European war as far back as the Summer of

1912. Intimate as Russo-Italian relations were, the aspiration of Vienna must have been known in St. Petersburg. In any event, M. Take Jonescu told me that M. Sazonoff had said in Constanza that an attack on Serbia on the part of Austria meant war with Russia.

In the Spring of 1914 one of my Secretaries, on returning from leave in Vienna, said that Herr von Tschirschky [German Ambassador in Vienna] had declared that war must soon come. But as I was always kept in the dark regarding important things, I considered his pessimism unfounded.

Ever since the peace of Bucharest it seems to have been the opinion in Vienna that the revision of this treaty should be undertaken independently, and only a favorable opportunity was awaited. The statesmen in Vienna and Bucharest could naturally count upon our support. This they knew, for already they had been reproached several times for their slackness. Berlin even insisted on the "rehabilitation" of Austria.

ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS

When I returned to London in December, 1913, after a long holiday, the Liman von Sanders question had led to our relations with Russia becoming acute. Sir Edward Grey called my attention with some uneasiness to the consequent unrest in St. Petersburg, saying: "I have never seen them so excited." Berlin instructed me to beg the Minister to urge calm in St. Petersburg and help to solve the difficulty. Sir Edward was quite willing, and his intervention contributed not inconsiderably to smoothing matters over. My good relations with Sir Edward and his great influence in St. Petersburg served in a like manner on several occasions when it was a question of carrying through something of which our representative there was completely incapable.

During the critical days of July, 1914, Sir Edward said to me: "If ever you want something done in St. Petersburg you come to me regularly, but if ever I appeal for your influence in Vienna you refuse your support." The good and dependable relations I was fortunate in

making not only in society and among influential people, such as Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith, but also with others at public dinners, had brought about a noticeable improvement in our relations with England. Sir Edward devoted himself honestly to further this rapprochement, and his intentions were especially noticeable in two questions—the Colonial Treaty and the treaty regarding the Bagdad Railway.

THE AFRICAN AGREEMENT

[This portion is translated from the Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten.]

In the year 1898 a secret treaty had been signed by Count Hatzfeldt [then German Ambassador in London] and Mr. Balfour, which divided the Portuguese colonies in Africa into economic-political spheres of interest between us and England. As the Portuguese Government possessed neither the power nor the means to open up or adequately to administer its extensive possessions, the Portuguese Government had already at an earlier date thought of selling these possessions and thereby putting their finances in order.

Between us and England an agreement had been reached which defined the interests of the two parties and which was of all the greater value because Portugal, as is well known, is completely dependent upon England. This treaty was no doubt to secure outwardly the integrity and independence of the Portuguese Empire, and it only expressed the intention of giving financial and economic assistance to the Portuguese. Consequently it did not, according to the text, conflict with the old Anglo-Portuguese alliance, dating from the fifteenth century, which was last renewed under Charles II. and which guaranteed the territories of the two parties. Nevertheless, at the instance of the Marquis Soveral, who presumably was not ignorant of the Anglo-German agreement, a new treaty—the so-called Windsor treaty—which confirmed the old agreements, was concluded in 1899 between England and Portugal.

ENGLAND'S GENEROUS ATTITUDE

The object of the negotiations between us and England, which had begun

before by arrival, was to alter and amend our treaty of 1898, which contained many impossible features—for example, with regard to the geographical delimitation. Thanks to the conciliatory attitude of the British Government, I succeeded in giving to the new treaty a form which entirely accorded with our wishes and interests. All Angola, as far as the 20th degree of longitude, was allotted to us, so that we reached the Congo territory from the south. Moreover, the valuable islands of San Thomé and Principe, which lie north of the equator, and therefore really belonged to the French sphere of interest, were allotted to us—a fact which caused my French colleague to make lively, although vain, representations. Further, we obtained the northern part of Mozambique; the frontier was formed by the Likungo.

The British Government showed the utmost readiness to meet our interests and wishes. Sir Edward Grey intended to prove his good-will to us, but he also desired to promote our colonial development, because England hoped to divert Germany's development of strength from the North Sea and Western Europe to the world-sea and Africa. "We don't want to grudge Germany her colonial development," a member of the Cabinet said to me.

THE CONGO STATE

Originally, at the British suggestion, the Congo State was to be included in the treaty, which would have given us a right of pre-emption and a possibility of economic penetration in the Congo State. But we refused this offer, out of alleged respect for Belgian sensibilities! Perhaps the idea was to economize our successes? With regard also to the practical realization of the real but unexpressed object of the treaty—the actual partition at a later date of the Portuguese colonial possessions—the new formulation showed considerable advantages and progress as compared with the old. Thus the treaty contemplated circumstances which would enable us to enter the territories ascribed to us, for the protection of our interests.

These conditional clauses were so wide

that it was really left to us to decide when really "vital" interests were concerned, so that, in view of the complete dependence of Portugal upon England we merely needed to go on cultivating our relations with England in order, later on, with English assent, to realize our mutual intentions.

The sincerity of the English Government in its effort to respect our rights was proved by the fact that Sir Edward Grey, before ever the treaty was completed or signed, called our attention to English men of business who were seeking opportunities to invest capital in the territories allotted to us by the new treaty, and who desired British support. In doing so he remarked that the undertakings in question belonged to our sphere of interest.

WILHELMSTRASSE INTRIGUES

The treaty was practically complete at the time of the King's visit to Berlin in May, 1913. A conversation then took place in Berlin under the Presidency of the Imperial Chancellor, (Herr von Bethmann Hollweg,) in which I took part, and at which special wishes were laid down. On my return to London I succeeded, with the help of my Counselor of Embassy, von Kühlmann, who was working upon the details of the treaty with Mr. Parker, in putting through our last proposals also. It was possible for the whole treaty to be initialed by Sir Edward Grey and myself in August, 1913, before I went on leave. Now, however, new difficulties were to arise, which prevented the signature, and it was only a year later, shortly before the outbreak of war, that I was able to obtain authorization for the final settlement. Signature, however, never took place.

Sir Edward Grey was willing to sign only if the treaty was published, together with the two treaties of 1898 and 1899; England has no other secret treaties, and it is contrary to her existing principles that she should conceal binding agreements. He said, however, that he was ready to take account of our wishes concerning the time and manner of publication, provided that publication took place within one year, at latest, after the sig-

nature. In the [Berlin] Foreign Office, however, where my London successes aroused increasing dissatisfaction, and where an influential personage, [the reference is apparently to Herr von Stumm,] who played the part of Herr von Holstein, was claiming the London Embassy for himself, it was stated that the publication would imperil our interests in the colonies, because the Portuguese would show their gratitude by giving us no more concessions. The accuracy of this excuse is illuminated by the fact that the old treaty was most probably just as much long known to the Portuguese as our new agreements must have been, in view of the intimacy of relations between Portugal and England; it was illuminated also by the fact that, in view of the influence which England possesses at Lisbon, the Portuguese Government is completely powerless in face of an Anglo-German understanding.

WRECKING THE TREATY

Consequently, it was necessary to find another excuse for wrecking the treaty. It was said that the publication of the Windsor Treaty, which was concluded in the time of Prince Hohenlohe, and which was merely a renewal of the treaty of Charles II., which had never lapsed, might imperil the position of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, as being a proof of British hypocrisy and perfidy! On this I pointed out that the preamble to our treaties said exactly the same thing as the Windsor Treaty and other similar treaties—namely, that we desired to protect the sovereign rights of Portugal and the integrity of its possessions!

In spite of repeated conversations with Sir Edward Grey, in which the Minister made ever fresh proposals concerning publication, the [Berlin] Foreign Office remained obstinate, and finally agreed with Sir Edward Goschen [British Ambassador in Berlin] that everything should remain as it was before. So the treaty, which gave us extraordinary advantages, the result of more than one year's work, had collapsed because it would have been a public success for me.

When in the Spring of 1914 I happened,

at a dinner in the embassy, at which Mr. Harcourt [then Colonial Secretary] was present, to mention the matter, the Colonial Secretary said that he was embarrassed and did not know how to behave. He said that the present state of affairs was intolerable, because he [Mr. Harcourt] wanted to respect our rights, but, on the other hand, was in doubt as to whether he should follow the old treaty or the new. He said that it was therefore extremely desirable to clear matters up, and to bring to a conclusion an affair which had been hanging on for so long.

"A DISASTROUS MISTAKE"

When I reported to this effect I received a rude and excited order, telling me to refrain from any further interference in the matter.

I now regret that I did not go to Berlin in order to offer his Majesty my resignation, and that I still did not lose my belief in the possibility of an agreement between me and the leading [German] personages. That was a disastrous mistake, which was to be tragically avenged some months later.

Slight though was the extent to which I then still possessed the good-will of the Imperial Chancellor—because he feared that I was aiming at his office—I must do him the justice to say that at the end of June, 1914, in our last conversation before the outbreak of war, he gave his consent to the signature and publication. Nevertheless, it required further repeated suggestions on my part, which were supported by Dr. Solf, [German Colonial Secretary,] in order at last to obtain official consent at the end of July. Then the Serbian crisis was already threatening the peace of Europe, and so the completion of the treaty had to be postponed. The treaty is now one of the victims of the war.

BAGDAD RAILWAY TREATY

[This portion is translated from the Stockholm Politiken of March 26.]

At the same time, while the African agreement was under discussion, I was negotiating, with the effective co-operation of Herr von Kühlmann, the so-called Bagdad Railway Treaty. This aimed, in

fact, at the division of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, although this expression was carefully avoided in consideration of the Sultan's rights. Sir Edward Grey declared repeatedly that there was no agreement between England and France aiming at a division of Asia Minor.

In the presence of the Turkish representative, Hakki Pasha, all economic questions in connection with the German treaty were settled mainly in accordance with the wishes of the Ottoman Bank. The greatest concession Sir Edward Grey made me personally was the continuation of the line to Basra. We had not insisted on this terminus in order to establish connection with Alexandretta. Hitherto Bagdad had been the terminus of the line. The shipping on the Shatt el Arab was to be in the hands of an international commission. We also obtained a share in the harbor works at Basra, and even acquired shipping rights on the Tigris, hitherto the monopoly of the firm of Lynch.

By this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia up to Basra became our zone of interest, whereby the whole British rights, the question of shipping on the Tigris, and the Wilcox establishments were left untouched, as well as all the district of Bagdad and the Anatolian railways.

The British economic territories included the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin railway, the French Syria, and the Russian Armenia. Had both treaties been concluded and published, an agreement would have been reached with England which would have finally ended all doubt of the possibility of an Anglo-German co-operation.

GERMAN NAVAL DEVELOPMENT

Most difficult of all, there remained the question of the fleet. It was never quite rightly judged. The creation of a mighty fleet on the other shore of the North Sea and the simultaneous development of the Continent's most important military power into its most important naval power had at least to be recognized by England as uncomfortable.

This presumably cannot be doubted. To maintain the necessary lead and not to become dependent, to preserve the supremacy of the sea, which Britain must have in order not to go down, she had to undertake preparations and expenses which weighed heavily on the taxpayer. A threat against the British world position was made in that our policy allowed the possibility of warlike development to appear. This possibility was obviously near during the Morocco crisis and the Bosnian question.

People had become reconciled to our fleet in its definite strength. Obviously it was not welcome to the British and constituted one of the motives, but neither the only nor the most important motive, for England's joining hands with Russia and France. On account of our fleet alone, however, England would have drawn the sword as little as on account of our trade, which it is pretended called forth her jealousy and ultimately brought about war.

From the beginning I adopted the standpoint that in spite of the fleet it would be possible to come to a friendly understanding and rapprochement if we did not propose new votes of credit, and, above all, if we carried out an indisputable peace policy. I also avoided all mention of the fleet, and between me and Sir Edward Grey the word was never uttered. Sir Edward Grey declared on one occasion at a Cabinet meeting: "The present German Ambassador has never mentioned the fleet to me."

UNDERSTANDING POSSIBLE

During my term of office the then First Lord, Mr. Churchill, raised the question of a so-called naval holiday, and proposed, for financial reasons as much as on account of the pacifist inclinations of his party, a one year's pause in armaments. Officially the suggestion was not supported by Sir Edward Grey. He never spoke of it to me, but Mr. Churchill spoke to me on repeated occasions.

I am convinced that his initiative was honest, cunning in general not being part of the Englishman's constitution. It would have been a great success for Mr.

Churchill to secure economies for the country and to lighten the burden of armament, which was weighing heavily on the people.

I maintain that it would have been difficult to support his intention. How about the workmen employed for this purpose? How about the technical personnel? Our naval program was settled, and it would be difficult to alter it. Nor, on the other hand, did we intend exceeding it. But he pointed out that the means spent on portentous armaments could equally be used for other purposes. I maintain that such expenditure would have benefited home industries.

NO TRADE JEALOUSY

I also succeeded, in conversation with Sir William Tyrrell, Sir Edward Grey's private secretary, in keeping away from that subject without raising suspicion, although it came up in Parliament, and in preventing the Government's proposal from being made. But it was Mr. Churchill's and the Government's favorite idea that by supporting his initiative in the matter of large ships we should give proof of our good-will and considerably strengthen and increase the tendency on the part of the Government to get in closer contact with us. But, as I have said, it was possible in spite of our fleet and without naval holidays to come to an understanding.

In that spirit I had carried out my mission from the beginning, and had even succeeded in realizing my program when the war broke out and destroyed everything.

Trade jealousy, so much talked about among us, rests on faulty judgment of circumstances. It is a fact that Germany's progress as a trading country after the war of 1870 and during the following decades threatened the interests of British trade circles, constituting a form of monopoly with its industry and export houses. But the growing interchange of merchandise with Germany, which was first on the list of all European exporting countries, a fact I always referred to in my public speeches, had allowed the desire to mature to pre-

serve good relations with England's best client and business friend, and had gradually suppressed all other thoughts and motives. The Englishman, as a matter of fact, adapts himself to circumstances and does not tilt against windmills. In commercial circles I found the greatest good-will and desire to further our common economic interests.

AMIABLY RECEIVED

In other circles I had a most amiable reception, and enjoyed the cordial good-will of the Court, society, and the Government. No one there interested himself in the Russian, Italian, Austrian, or even the French representative, in spite of the imposing personality and political success of the last named. Only the German and American Ambassadors attracted public attention.

In order to get in touch with the most important business circles I accepted invitations from the United Chambers of Commerce, the London and Bradford Chambers, and those of the great cities of Newcastle and Liverpool. I had a hearty reception everywhere. Glasgow and Edinburgh had also invited me, and I promised them visits. People who did not understand English conditions and did not appreciate the value of public dinners, and others who disliked my success, reproached me with having done harm by my speeches. I, on the contrary, believe that my public appearances and my discussion of common economic interests contributed considerably toward the improvement of conditions, apart from the fact that it would have been impolitic and impolite to refuse invitations.

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INFLUENCE OF THE CROWN

The King, very amiable and well meaning and possessed of sound understanding and common sense, was invariably well disposed toward me and desired honestly to facilitate my mission. In spite of the small amount of power which the British Constitution gives the Crown, the

King can, by virtue of his position, greatly influence the tone both of society and the Government. The Crown is the apex of society from which the tone emanates. Society, which is overwhelmingly Unionist, is largely occupied by ladies connected with politics. It is represented in the Lords and the Commons, consequently also in the Cabinet.

The Englishman either belongs to society or ought to belong to it. His aim is, and always will be, to be a distinguished man and a gentleman, and even men of modest origin, such as Mr. Asquith, prefer to be in society, with its elegant women.

POLITICS AND SOCIETY

British gentlemen of both parties enjoy the same education, go to the same colleges and university, and engage in the same sports—golf, cricket, lawn tennis, and polo. All have played cricket and football in their youth, all have the same habits, and all spend the week-end in the country. No social cleavage divides the parties, only political cleavage. To some extent of late years the politicians in the two camps have avoided one another in society. Not even on the ground of a neutral mission could the two camps be amalgamated, for since the Home Rule and Veto bills the Unionists have despised the Radicals. A few months after my arrival the King and Queen dined with me, and Lord Londonderry left the house after dinner in order not to be together with Sir Edward Grey. But there is no opposition from difference in caste and education as in France. There are not two worlds, but the same world, and their opinion of a foreigner is common and not without influence on his political standing, whether a Lansdowne or an Asquith is at the helm.

The difference of caste no longer exists in England since the time of the Stuarts and since the Whig oligarchy (in contradistinction to the Tory county families) allowed the bourgeoisie in the towns to rise in society. There is greater difference in political opinions on constitutional or Church questions than on financial or political questions. Aristocrats who have joined the popular party,

Radicals such as Grey, Churchill, Harcourt, and Crewe, are most hated by the Unionist aristocracy. None of these gentlemen have I ever met in great aristocratic houses, only in the houses of party friends.

We were received in London with open arms and both parties outdid one another in amiability.

It would be a mistake to undervalue social connections in view of the close connection in England between society and politics, even though the majority of the upper ten thousand are in opposition to the Government. Between an Asquith and a Devonshire there is no such deep cleft as between a Briand and a Duc de Doudeauville, for example. In times of political tension they do not foregather. They belong to two separate social groups, but are part of the same society, if on different levels, the centre of which is the Court. They have friends and habits in common, they are often related or connected. A phenomenon like Lloyd George, a man of the people, a small solicitor and a self-made man, is an exception. Even John Burns, a Socialist Labor leader and a self-taught man, seeks society relations. On the ground of a general striving to be considered gentlemen of social weight and position such men must not be undervalued.

In no place, consequently, is an envoy's social circle of greater consequence than in England. A hospitable house with friendly guests is worth more than the profoundest scientific knowledge, and a learned man of insignificant appearance and too small means would, in spite of all his learning, acquire no influence. The Briton hates a bore and a pedant. He loves a good fellow.

SIR EDWARD GREY'S SOCIALISM

Sir Edward Grey's influence in all questions of foreign policy was almost unlimited. True, he used to say on important occasions: "I must lay that before the Cabinet"; but it is equally true that the latter invariably took his view. Although he did not know foreign countries and, with the exception of one short visit to Paris, had never left England, he was closely informed on all important

questions, owing to many years' Parliamentary experience and natural grasp. He understood French without speaking it. Elected at an early age to Parliament, he began immediately to occupy himself with foreign affairs. Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office under Lord Rosebery, he became in 1906 Secretary of State under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and filled the post for ten years.

Sprung from an old North of England family of landowners, from whom the statesman, Earl Grey, is also descended, he joined the left wing of his party and sympathized with the Socialists and pacifists. He can be called a Socialist in the ideal sense, for he applied his theories even in private life, which is characterized by great simplicity and unpretentiousness, although he is possessed of considerable means. All display is foreign to him. He had a small residence in London and never gave dinners, except officially, at the Foreign Office on the King's birthday.

SIMPLE MODE OF LIFE

If, exceptionally, he asked a few guests to his house, it was to a simple dinner or luncheon in a small circle with parlor maids for service. The week-ends he spent regularly in the country, like his colleagues, but not at large country house parties. He lives mostly in his cottage in the New Forest, taking long walks, and is passionately fond of nature and ornithology. Or he journeyed to his property in the north and tamed squirrels. In his youth he was a noted cricket and tennis player. His chief sport is now salmon and trout fishing in the Scotch lakes with Lord Glenconner, Mr. Asquith's brother-in-law. Once, when spending his week-ends with Lord Glenconner, he came thirty miles on a bicycle and returned in the same way. His simple, upright manner insured him the esteem even of his opponents, who were more easily to be found in home than in foreign political circles.

Lies and intrigue were foreign to his nature. His wife, whom he loved and from whom he was never separated, died as the result of an accident to the car-

riage driven by him. As is known, one brother was killed by a lion.

Wordsworth was his favorite poet, and he could quote him by the hour. His British calm did not lack a sense of humor. When breakfasting with us and the children and he heard their German conversation, he would say, "I cannot help admiring the way they talk German," and laughed at his joke. This is the man who was called "the Liar Grey" and the "originator of the world war."

ASQUITH AND HIS FAMILY

Asquith is a man of quite different mold. A jovial, sociable fellow, a friend of the ladies, especially young and beautiful ones, he loves cheery surroundings and a good cook, and is supported by a cheery young wife. He was formerly a well-known lawyer, with a large income and many years' Parliamentary experience. Later he was known as a Minister under Gladstone, a pacifist like his friend Grey, and friendly to an understanding with Germany. He treated all questions with an experienced business man's calm and certainty, and enjoyed good health and excellent nerves, steeled by assiduous golf.

His daughters went to a German boarding school and speak fluent German. We quickly became good friends with him and his family, and were guests at his little house on the Thames.

He only rarely occupied himself with foreign affairs. When important questions cropped up, with him lay the ultimate decision. During the critical days of July Asquith often came to warn us, and he was ultimately in despair over the tragic turn of events. On Aug. 2, when I saw Asquith in order to make a final attempt, he was completely broken, and, although quite calm, tears ran down his face.

NICOLSON AND TYRRELL

Sir Arthur Nicolson and Sir William Tyrrell had the greatest influence in the Foreign Office. The former was not our friend, but his attitude toward me was consistently correct and obliging. Our personal relations were of the best. Neither did he wish for war, but when

we [moved?] against France he undoubtedly worked for immediate intervention. He was the confidant of my French colleague, and was in constant touch with him, and was destined to succeed Lord Bertie in Paris. As is known, Sir Arthur was formerly Ambassador in St. Petersburg, and had concluded the treaty of 1907 which enabled Russia to turn again to the West and the Near East.

Sir Edward Grey's private secretary, Sir William Tyrrell, had far greater influence than the Permanent Under Secretary of State. This unusually intelligent man had been at a school in Germany, and had then entered the Diplomatic Service, but he was abroad only a short time. At first he belonged to the modern anti-German school of young English diplomats, but later he became a determined supporter of an understanding. To this aim and object he even influenced Sir Edward Grey, with whom he was very intimate. After the outbreak of war he left the department, and went to the Home Office, probably in consequence of criticism of him for his Germanophile leanings.

CABALS AGAINST LICHNOWSKY

The rage of certain gentlemen over my success in London and the position I had achieved was indescribable. Schemes were set on foot to impede my carrying out my duties, I was left in complete ignorance of most important things, and had to confine myself to sending in unimportant and dull reports. Secret reports from agents about things of which I could know nothing without spies and necessary funds were never available for me, and it was only in the last days of July, 1914, that I heard accidentally from the Naval Attaché of the secret Anglo-French agreement for joint action of the two fleets in case of war. Soon after my arrival I became convinced that in no circumstances need we fear a British attack or British support of a foreign attack, but that under all conditions England would protect France. I advanced this opinion in repeated reports with detailed reasoning and insistence, but without gaining credence, although Lord Hal-

dane's refusing of the formula of neutrality and England's attitude during the Morocco crisis were clear indications. In addition, the above-mentioned secret agreements were known to the department. I repeatedly urged that England, as a commercial State, would suffer greatly in any war between the European great powers, and would therefore prevent such a war by all available means; but, on the other hand, in the interest of the European balance of power, and to prevent Germany's overlordship, would never tolerate the weakening or destruction of France. Lord Haldane told me this shortly after my arrival. All influential people spoke in the same way.

THE ARCHDUKE'S DEATH

At the end of June I went to Kiel by the royal orders a few weeks after I had received the honorary degree of Doctor at Oxford, an honor no German Ambassador since Herr von Bunsen had received. On board the Meteor we received the news of the death of the Archduke, the heir to the throne. His Majesty complained that his attempts to win the noble Archduke over to his ideas were thereby rendered fruitless. How far plans for an active policy against Serbia had already been made at Konopischt I am not in a position to judge. As I was not informed about intentions and events in Vienna I attached no further importance to the matter. I could only observe that the feeling of relief outweighed the other feelings of the Austrian aristocrats. One of the guests on board the Meteor was the Austrian Count Felix Thun. In spite of glorious weather seasickness had kept him to his cabin. After receiving the news he became well. Shock or joy had cured him.

On reaching Berlin I visited the Chancellor, and said I considered the situation of our foreign policy very satisfactory, as we were on better terms with England than we had been for a long time. In France a pacifist Government was at the helm. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg did not seem to share my optimism, and complained of the Russian armaments. I tried to calm him, and pointed out especially that Russia had

absolutely no interest in attacking us, and that such an attack would not receive Anglo-French support, as both countries, England and France, desired peace. Then I called on Dr. Zimmermann, who represented von Jagow, and learned from him that Russia was about to mobilize 900,000 new troops. From his manner of speaking he was evidently annoyed with Russia, who was everywhere in our way. There was also the question of the difficulties of commercial politics. Of course, I was not told that General von Moltke was working eagerly for war. But I learned that Herr von Tschirschky had received a rebuff for having reported that he had advised moderation in Vienna toward Serbia.

AUSTRIA'S WAR PLOT

On my return journey from Silesia I only remained a few hours in Berlin, but I heard there that Austria intended to take steps against Serbia to put an end to this intolerable situation. Unfortunately I undervalued the importance of the information. I thought nothing would come of it, and that it would be easy to settle the matter if Russia threatened. I now regret that I did not stop in Berlin, and at once declare that I could not agree to such a policy.

I have since learned that the inquiries and appeals from Vienna won unconditional assent from all the influential men at a decisive consultation at Potsdam on July 5, with the comment that it would not matter if war with Russia resulted. This is what was stated, anyhow, in the Austrian protocol which Count Mensdorff received in London. Shortly afterward Herr von Jagow arrived in Vienna to discuss the whole question with Count Berchtold.

Subsequently, I received instructions to work to obtain a friendly attitude on the part of the English press, if Austria dealt Serbia a deathblow, and by my influence to prevent so far as possible public opinion from becoming opposed to Austria. Remembering England's attitude during the annexation crisis, when public opinion sympathized with Serbian rights to Bosnia, and her kindly favoring of national movements in the time of

Lord Byron and that of Garibaldi, one thing and another indicated so strongly the improbability of British support of the proposed punitive expedition against the Archduke's murderers, that I felt bound to issue a serious warning. I also sent a warning against the whole project, which I characterized as adventurous and dangerous, and advised moderation being urged on the Austrians, as I did not believe in the localization of the conflict.

JAGOW'S MISTAKEN BLUFF

Herr von Jagow answered that Russia was not ready, that there would be some fuss, but that the more firmly we held to Austria the sooner would Russia give way. Austria, he said, had already accused us of flabbiness, (*flaumacherei*), and so we must not get into a mess. Opinion in Russia, he added, was becoming more and more pro-German, so we must just take the risks. In view of this attitude, which, as I subsequently found out, was the result of Count Pourtalès's reports that Russia would in no circumstances move, and caused us to urge Count Berchtold to the greatest possible energy, I hoped for salvation in English intervention, as I knew Sir Edward Grey's influence with St. Petersburg in the direction of peace could prevail. I availed myself, therefore, of my good relations with the British Foreign Minister to beg him confidentially to advise moderation on the part of Russia in case Austria, as appeared probable, should demand satisfaction from the Serbians.

In the beginning the attitude of the English press toward the Austrians was quiet and friendly, as the murder was condemned. Little by little, however, voices increased in number insisting that, however necessary the punishment of a crime might be, no elaboration of it for a political purpose could be justified. Austria was urgently called upon to act with moderation. The whole world outside Berlin and Vienna understood that it meant war, and world war. The British fleet, which happened to be assembled for review, was not demobilized.

The Serbian answer corresponded with British efforts, for actually M. Pashitch had accepted all but two points, about

which he was prepared to negotiate. Had England and Russia wanted war in order to fall upon us, a hint to Belgrade would have been given, and the unspeakable note would have remained unanswered. Sir Edward Grey went through the Serbian answer with me, and pointed out the conciliatory attitude of the Belgrade Government. We even discussed his proposal for intervention, which should insure an interpretation of these two points acceptable to both parties. With Sir Edward Grey presiding, M. Cambon, the Marquis Imperiali, and I were to meet, and it would have been easy to find an acceptable form for the points under discussion, which were mainly concerned with the part to be taken by Austrian officials in the inquiries at Belgrade. With good-will all could have been cleared up in two or three sittings, and a simple acknowledgment of the British proposal would have brought about a *détente* and further improved our relations with England. I therefore urged it forcibly, as otherwise a world war stood at our gates.

In vain. It would be, I was told, wounding to Austria's dignity, nor would we mix ourselves up in that Serbian matter. We left it to our allies. I was to work for the localization of the conflict. It naturally only needed a hint from Berlin to induce Count Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success and put up with the Serbian reply. But this hint was not given. On the contrary, we pressed for war. What a fine success it would have been!

INTOLERABLE CONDITIONS

After our refusal Sir Edward asked us to come forward with a proposal of our own. We insisted upon war. I could get no other answer [from Berlin] than that it was an enormous "concession" on the part of Austria to contemplate no annexation of territory.

Thereupon Sir Edward justly pointed out that even without annexations of territory a country can be humiliated and subjected, and that Russia would regard this as a humiliation which she would not stand.

The impression became ever stronger

that we desired war in all circumstances. Otherwise our attitude in a question which, after all, did not directly concern us was unintelligible. The urgent appeals and definite declarations of M. Sazonoff, [Russian Foreign Minister,] later on the positively humble telegrams of the Czar, the repeated proposals of Sir Edward, the warnings of San Giuliano [Italian Foreign Minister] and of Bollati, [Italian Ambassador in Berlin,] my urgent advice—all were of no use, for Berlin went on insisting that Serbia must be massacred.

The more I pressed, the less willing they were to alter their course, if only because I was not to have the success of saving peace in the company of Sir Edward Grey.

So Grey on July 29 resolved upon his well-known warning. I replied that I had always reported that we should have to reckon upon English hostility if it came to war with France. The Minister said to me repeatedly: "If war breaks out it will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen."

GREY STILL SOUGHT PEACE

After that events moved rapidly. When Count Berchtold, who hitherto had played the strong man on instructions from Berlin, at last decided to change his course, we answered the Russian mobilization—after Russia had for a whole week negotiated and waited in vain—with our ultimatum and declaration of war.

Sir Edward Grey still looked for new ways of escape. In the morning of Aug. 1, Sir W. Tyrrell came to me to say that his chief still hoped to find a way out. Should we remain neutral if France did the same? I understood him to mean that we should then be ready to spare France, but his meaning was that we should remain absolutely neutral—neutral therefore even toward Russia. That was the well-known misunderstanding. Sir Edward had given me an appointment for the afternoon, but as he was then at a meeting of the Cabinet, he called me up on the telephone, after Sir W. Tyrrell had hurried straight to him. But in the afternoon he spoke no longer

of anything but Belgian neutrality, and of the possibility that we and France should face one another armed, without attacking one another.

Thus there was no proposal whatever, but a question without any obligation, because our conversation, as I have already explained, was to take place soon afterward. In Berlin, however—without waiting for the conversation—this news was used as the foundation for a far-reaching act. Then came Poincaré's letter, Bonar Law's letter, and the telegram from the King of the Belgians. The hesitating members of the Cabinet were converted, with the exception of three members, who resigned.

PEACE HOPES DESTROYED

Up to the last moment I had hoped for a waiting attitude on the part of England. My French colleague also felt himself by no means secure, as I learned from a private source. As late as Aug. 1 the King replied evasively to the French President. But in the telegram from Berlin, which announced the threatening danger of war, England was already mentioned as an opponent. In Berlin, therefore, one already reckoned upon war with England.

Before my departure Sir Edward Grey received me on Aug. 5 at his house. I had gone there at his desire. He was deeply moved. He said to me that he would always be ready to mediate, and, "We don't want to crush Germany." Unfortunately, this confidential conversation was published. Thereby Herr von Bethmann Hollweg destroyed the last possibility of reaching peace via England.

Our departure was thoroughly dignified and calm. Before we left, the King had sent his equerry, Sir E. Ponsonby, to me, to express his regret at my departure and that he could not see me personally. Princess Louise wrote to me that the whole family lamented our going. Mrs. Asquith and other friends came to the embassy to say good-bye.

A special train took us to Harwich, where a guard of honor was drawn up for me. I was treated like a departing sovereign. Thus ended my London mission. It was wrecked, not by the perfidy

of the British, but by the perfidy of our policy.

At the railway station in London Count Mensdorff [Austrian Ambassador] appeared with his staff. He was cheerful, and gave me to understand that perhaps he would remain in London. But to the English he said that it was not Austria, but we, who had wanted the war.

A BITTER RETROSPECT

When now, after two years, I realize everything in retrospect, I say to myself that I realized too late that there was no place for me in a system which for years has lived only on tradition and routine, and which tolerates only representatives who report what one wants to read. Absence of prejudice and an independent judgment are combated, want of ability and of character are extolled and esteemed, but successes arouse hostility and uneasiness.

I had abandoned opposition to our mad Triple Alliance policy, because I saw that it was useless and that my warnings were represented as Austrophobia and an *idée fixe*. In a policy which is not mere gymnastics, or playing with documents, but the conduct of the business of the firm, there is no such thing as likes and dislikes; there is nothing but the interest of the community; but a policy which is based merely upon Austrians, Magyars, and Turks must end in hostility to Russia, and ultimately lead to a catastrophe.

In spite of former aberrations, everything was still possible in July, 1914. Agreement with England had been reached. We should have had to send to Petersburg a representative who, at any rate, reached the average standard of political ability, and we should have had to give Russia the certainty that we desired neither to dominate the Straits nor to throttle the Serbs. M. Sazonoff was saying to us: "*Lâchez l'Autriche et nous lâcherons les Français,*" and M. Cambon [French Ambassador in Berlin] said to Herr von Jagow: "*Vous n'avez [pas] besoin de suivre l'Autriche partout.*"

We needed neither alliances nor wars, but merely treaties which would protect

us and others, and which would guarantee us an economic development for which there had been no precedent in history. And if Russia had been relieved of trouble in the west, she would have been able to turn again to the east, and then the Anglo-Russian antagonism would have arisen automatically without our interference—and the Russo-Japanese antagonism no less than the Anglo-Russian.

We could also have approached the question of limitation of armaments, and should have had no further need to bother about the confusions of Austria. Austria-Hungary would then become the vassal of the German Empire—without an alliance, and, above all, without sentimental services on our part, leading ultimately to war for the liberation of Poland and the destruction of Serbia, although German interests demanded exactly the contrary.

I had to support in London a policy which I knew to be fallacious. I was punished for it, for it was a sin against the Holy Ghost.

ARRIVAL AT BERLIN

On my arrival in Berlin I saw at once that I was to be made the scapegoat for the catastrophe of which our Government had made itself guilty in opposition to my advice and my warnings.

The report was persistently circulated by official quarters that I had let myself be deceived by Sir Edward Grey, because if he had not wanted war Russia would not have mobilized. Count Pourtalès, whose reports could be relied upon, was to be spared, if only because of his family connections. He was said to have behaved "*splendidly,*" and he was enthusiastically praised, while I was all the more sharply blamed.

"What has Russia got to do with Serbia?" this statesman said to me after eight years of official activity in Petersburg. It was made out that the whole business was a perfidious British trick which I had not understood. In the Foreign Office I was told that in 1916 it would in any case have come to war. But then Russia would have been "*ready,*" and so it was better now.

As appears from all official publica-

tions, without the facts being controverted by our own White Book, which, owing to its poverty and gaps, constitutes a grave self-accusation:

1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although no German interest was involved, and the danger of a world war must have been known to us—whether we knew the text of the ultimatum is a question of complete indifference.

2. In the days between July 23 and July 30, 1914, when M. Sazonoff emphatically declared that Russia could not tolerate an attack upon Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole ultimatum, and although an agreement about the two points in question could easily have been reached, and Count Berchtold was even ready to satisfy himself with the Serbian reply.

3. On July 30, when Count Berchtold wanted to give way, we, without Austria having been attacked, replied to Russia's mere mobilization by sending an ultimatum to Petersburg, and on July 31 we declared war on the Russians, although the Czar had pledged his word that as long as negotiations continued not a man should march—so that we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a peaceful settlement.

In view of these indisputable facts, it is not surprising that the whole civilized world outside Germany attributes to us the sole guilt for the world war.

GERMANY'S WAR SPIRIT

Is it not intelligible that our enemies declare that they will not rest until a system is destroyed which constitutes a permanent threatening of our neighbors? Must they not otherwise fear that in a few years they will again have to take up arms, and again see their provinces overrun and their towns and villages destroyed? Were these people not right who prophesied that the spirit of Treitschke and Bernhardt dominated the German people—the spirit which glorifies war as an aim in itself and does not abhor it as an evil; that among us it is still the feudal knights and Junkers

and the caste of warriors who rule and who fix our ideals and our values—not the civilian gentleman; that the love of dueling, which inspires our youth at the universities, lives on in those who guide the fortunes of the people? Had not the events at Zabern and the Parliamentary debates on that case shown foreign countries how civil rights and freedoms are valued among us, when questions of military power are on the other side?

Cramb, a historian who has since died, an admirer of Germany, put the German point of view into the words of Euphorion:

Träumt Ihr den Friedenstag?
Träume, wer träumen mag!
Krieg ist das Lösungswort!
Sieg, und so klingt es fort.

Militarism, really a school for the nation and an instrument of policy, makes policy into the instrument of military power, if the patriarchal absolutism of a soldier-kingdom renders possible an attitude which would not be permitted by a democracy which had disengaged itself from military-junker influences.

That is what our enemies think, and that is what they are bound to think, when they see that, in spite of capitalistic industrialization, and in spite of socialistic organization, the living, as Friedrich Nietzsche says, are still governed by the dead. The principal war aim of our enemies, the democratization of Germany, will be achieved.

JEOPARDIZING THE FUTURE

Today, after two years of the war, there can be no further doubt that we cannot hope for an unconditional victory over Russians, English, French, Italians, Rumanians, and Americans, and that we cannot reckon upon the overthrow of our enemies. But we can reach a compromised peace only upon the basis of the evacuation of the occupied territories, the possession of which in any case signifies for us a burden and weakness and the peril of new wars. Consequently, everything should be avoided which hinders a change of course on the part of those enemy groups which might perhaps still be won over to the idea of compromise—the British Radicals and the Russian

Reactionaries. Even from this point of view our Polish project is just as objectionable as any interference with Belgian rights, or the execution of British citizens—to say nothing of the mad submarine war scheme.

Our future lies upon the water. True, but it therefore does not lie in Poland and Belgium, in France and Serbia. That is a reversion to the Holy Roman Empire, to the aberrations of the Hohenstaufens and Hapsburgs. It is the policy of the Plantagenets, not the policy of Drake and Raleigh, Nelson and Rhodes.

RUINOUS RESULTS

Triple Alliance policy is a relapse into the past, a revolt from the future, from imperialism, from world policy. Central Europe is mediaevalism; Berlin-Bagdad is a cul de sac, and not a road into the open, to unlimited possibilities, and to the world mission of the German people.

I am no enemy of Austria, or Hungary, or Italy, or Serbia, or any other State; I am only an enemy of the Triple Alliance policy, which was bound to divert us from our aims, and to bring us on to the sloping plane of Continental policy. It was not German policy, but Austrian dynastic policy. The Austrians had accustomed themselves to regard the alliance as a shield, under whose protection they could make excursions at pleasure into the East.

And what result have we to expect

from the struggle of peoples? The United States of Africa will be British, like the United States of America, of Australia, and of Oceania, and the Latin States of Europe, as I said years ago, will fall into the same relationship to the United Kingdom as the Latin sisters of America to the United States. They will be dominated by the Anglo-Saxon; France, exhausted by the war, will link herself still more closely to Great Britain. In the long run, Spain also will not resist.

In Asia, the Russian and Japanese will expand their borders and their customs, and the south will remain to the British.

The world will belong to the Anglo-Saxon, the Russian, and the Japanese, and the German will remain alone with Austria and Hungary. His sphere of power will be that of thought and of trade, not that of the bureaucrats and the soldiers. The German appeared too late, and the world war has destroyed the last possibility of catching up the lost ground, of founding a colonial empire.

For we shall not supplant the sons of Japheth; the program of the great Rhodes, who saw the salvation of mankind in British expansion and British imperialism, will be realized.

*Tu regere imperio populos Romano, memento.
Hae tibi erunt artes: pacisque imponere
morem,*

Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos.

Krupp Director Confirms Prince Lichnowsky's Indictment

COINCIDENT with the publication in Germany of the famous memorandum of Prince Lichnowsky squarely putting the blame for the outbreak of the world war upon the Kaiser and the German militarists, there also appeared in circular form in Germany a letter written by a certain Dr. Mühlön, a former member of the Krupp Directorate now living in Switzerland, corroborating the charges made by the Prince. The Mühlön letter was briefly referred to in an official dispatch from Switzerland received

in Washington on March 29 as having produced an animated discussion throughout the empire.

A copy of the *Leipziger Volkszeitung* of March 20 tells how, in a discussion of the Lichnowsky and Mühlön memoranda before the Main Committee of the Reichstag on March 16, Vice Chancellor von Payer tried to minimize the value of Dr. Mühlön's statements by asserting that the former Krupp Director was a sick, nervous man who no doubt did not intend to injure his country's cause, but who

was hardly responsible for his actions because of his many nervous breakdowns. Later, the Berliner Tageblatt printed the text of Dr. Mühlon's letter, which was evidently written before the resignation of Dr. Karl Helfferich as Vice Chancellor last November. As translated by The London Times, Dr. Mühlon's memorandum reads:

TALK WITH HELFFERICH

"In the middle of July, 1914, I had, as I frequently had, a conversation with Dr. Helfferich, then Director of the Deutsche Bank in Berlin, and now Vice Chancellor. The Deutsche Bank had adopted a negative attitude toward certain large transactions in Bulgaria and Turkey, in which the firm of Krupp, for business reasons—delivery of war material—had a lively interest. As one of the reasons to justify the attitude of the Deutsche Bank, Dr. Helfferich finally gave me the following reason:

"The political situation has become very menacing. The Deutsche Bank must in any case wait before entering into any further engagements abroad. The Austrians have just been with the Kaiser. In a week's time Vienna will send a very severe ultimatum to Serbia, with a very short interval for the answer. The ultimatum will contain demands such as punishment of a number of officers, dissolution of political associations, criminal investigation in Serbia by Austrian officials, and, in fact, a whole series of definite satisfactions will be demanded at once; otherwise Austria-Hungary will declare war on Serbia.

"Dr. Helfferich added that the Kaiser had expressed his decided approval of this procedure on the part of Austria-Hungary. He had said that he regarded a conflict with Serbia as an internal affair between these two countries, in which he would permit no other State to interfere. If Russia mobilized, he would mobilize also. But in his case mobilization meant immediate war. This time there would be no oscillation. Helfferich said that the Austrians were extremely well satisfied at this determined attitude on the part of the Kaiser.

"When I thereupon said to Dr. Helfferich that this uncanny communication converted my fears of a world war, which were already strong, into abso-

lute certainty, he replied that it certainly looked like that. But perhaps France and Russia would reconsider the matter. In any case, the Serbs deserved a lesson which they would remember. This was the first intimation that I had received about the Kaiser's discussions with our allies. I knew Dr. Helfferich's particularly intimate relations with the personages who were sure to be initiated, and I knew that his communication was trustworthy.

KAISER FOR WAR

"After my return from Berlin I informed Herr Krupp von Böhlen and Halbach, one of whose Directors I then was at Essen. Dr. Helfferich had given me permission and at that time the intention was to make him a Director of Krupps. Herr von Böhlen seemed disturbed that Dr. Helfferich was in possession of such information, and he made a remark to the effect that the Government people can never keep their mouths shut. He then told me the following. He said that he had himself been with the Kaiser in the last few days. The Kaiser had spoken to him also of his conversation with the Austrians, and of its result; but he had described the matter as so secret that he [Krupp] would not even have dared to inform his own Directors. As, however, I already knew, he could tell me that Helfferich's statements were accurate. Indeed, Helfferich seemed to know more details than he did. He said that the situation was really very serious. The Kaiser had told him that he would declare war immediately if Russia mobilized, and that this time people would see that he did not turn about. The Kaiser's repeated insistence that this time nobody would be able to accuse him of indecision had, he said, been almost comic in its effect.

GERMAN DUPLICITY

"On the very day indicated to me by Helfferich the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia appeared. At this time I was again in Berlin, and I told Helfferich that I regarded the tone and contents of the ultimatum as simply monstrous. Dr. Helfferich, however, said that the

note only had that ring in the German translation. He had seen the ultimatum in French, and in French it really could not be regarded as overdone. On this occasion Helfferich also said to me that the Kaiser had gone on his northern cruise only as a 'blind'; he had not arranged the cruise on the usual extensive scale, but was remaining close at hand and keeping in constant touch. Now one must simply wait and see what would happen. The Austrians, who, of course, did not expect the ultimatum to be accepted, were really acting rapidly before the other powers could find time to interfere. The Deutsche Bank had already made its arrangements, so as to be prepared for all eventualities. For example, it was no longer paying out the gold which came in. That could easily be done without attracting notice, and the amount day by day reached considerable sums.

"Immediately after the Vienna ultimatum to Serbia the German Government issued declarations to the effect that Austria-Hungary had acted all alone, without Germany's previous knowledge. When one attempted to reconcile these declarations with the events mentioned above, the only possible explanation was that the Kaiser had tied himself down without inviting the co-operation of his Government, and that, in the conversations with the Austrians, the Germans took care not to agree upon the text of the ultimatum. For I have already shown that the contents of the ultimatum were pretty accurately known in Germany.

"Herr Krupp von Böhlen, with whom I spoke about these German declarations—which, at any rate in their effect, were lies—was also by no means edified. For, as he said, Germany ought not, in such a tremendous affair, to have given a blank check to a State like Austria; and it was the duty of the leading statesmen to demand, both of the Kaiser and of our allies, that the Austrian claims and the ultimatum to Serbia should be discussed in minute detail and definitely decided upon, and also that we should decide upon the precise program of our further proceedings. He said that, whatever point of view one took, we ought not to give our-

selves into the hands of the Austrians and expose ourselves to eventualities which had not been reckoned out in advance. One ought to have connected appropriate conditions with our obligations. In short, Herr von Böhlen regarded the German denial of previous knowledge, if there was any trace of truth in it, as an offense against the elementary principles of diplomacy; and he told me that he intended to speak in this sense to Herr von Jagow, then Foreign Secretary, who was a special friend of his.

GERMAN GOVERNMENT BLAMED

"As a result of this conversation Herr von Böhlen told me that Herr von Jagow stuck firmly to his assertion that he had had nothing to do with the text of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, and that Germany had never made any such demands. In reply to the objection that this was inconceivable, Herr von Jagow replied that he, as a diplomatist, had naturally thought of making such a demand. When, however, Herr von Jagow was occupying himself with the matter and was called in, the Kaiser had so committed himself that it was too late for any procedure according to diplomatic custom, and there was nothing more to be done. The situation was such that it would have been impossible to intervene with drafting proposals. In the end, he [Jagow] had thought that non-interference would have its advantages—namely, the good impression which could be made in Petersburg and Paris with the German declaration that Germany had not co-operated in the preparation of the Vienna ultimatum."

A REMARKABLE LETTER

Herr Mühlson authorized the *Humanité*, a Paris Socialist paper, through its Swiss correspondent, to publish the following remarkable letter which he addressed from Berne, on May 7, 1917, to Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, then Imperial Chancellor:

"However great the number and weight of the mistakes accumulated on the German side since the beginning of the war, I nevertheless persisted for a long time in the belief that a belated

foresight would at last dawn upon the minds of our Directors. It was with this hope that I put myself to a certain extent at your disposal, in order to collaborate with you in Rumania, and that I indicated to you that I was disposed to help in Switzerland, where I am living at present, if the object of our efforts was to be rapprochement of the enemy parties. That I was, and that I remain, hostile to any activity other than reconciliation and restoration I proved soon after the opening of hostilities by the definite resignation of my Directorship of Krupp's works.

"But since the first days of 1917 I have abandoned all hope as regards the present Directors of Germany. Our offer of peace without indication of our war aims, the accentuation of the submarine war, the deportations of Belgians, the systematic destruction in France, and the torpedoing of English hospital ships have so degraded the Governors of the German Empire that I am profoundly convinced that they are disqualified forever for the elaboration and conclusion of a sincere and just agreement. The personalities may change, but they cannot remain the representatives of the German cause.

"The German people will not be able to repair the grievous crimes committed

against its own present and future, and against that of Europe and the whole human race until it is represented by different men with a different mentality. To tell the truth, it is mere justice that its reputation throughout the whole world is as bad as it is. The triumph of its methods—the methods by which it has hitherto conducted the war both militarily and politically—would constitute a defeat for the ideas and the supreme hopes of mankind. One has only to imagine that a people exhausted, demoralized, or hating violence, should consent to a peace with a Government which has conducted such a war, in order to understand how the general level and the chances of life of the peoples would remain black and deceptive.

"As a man and as a German who desires nothing but the welfare of the deceived and tortured German people, I turn away definitely from the present representatives of the German régime. And I have only one wish—that all independent men may do the same and that many Germans may understand and act.

"In view of the fact that it is impossible for me at present to make any manifestation before German public opinion, I have thought it to be my absolute duty to inform your Excellency of my point of view."

Reichstag Debate on Lichnowsky

THE Main Committee of the Reichstag dealt with Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum on March 16. Herr von Payer, Vice Chancellor, stated that Prince Lichnowsky himself on March 15 made a statement to the Imperial Chancellor, in which he said:

"Your Excellency knows that the purely private notes which I wrote down in the Summer of 1916 found their way into wider circles by an unprecedented breach of confidence. It was mainly a question of subjective considerations about our entire foreign policy since the Berlin Congress. I perceived in the policy hitherto pursued of repelling (in der seitherigen Abkehr) Russia and in the extension of the policy of alliances to Oriental questions the real roots of the world war. I then submitted our Morocco naval policy to a brief examination. My London mission could at the same time not remain out of

consideration, especially as I felt the need in regard to the future and with a view to my own justification of noting the details of my experiences and impressions there before they vanished from my memory. These notes were intended in a certain degree only for family archives, and I wrote them down without documentary material or notes from the period of my official activity. I considered I might show them, on the assurance of absolute secrecy, to a very few political friends in whose judgment as well as trustworthiness I had equal confidence."

Lichnowsky Resigns Rank

Prince Lichnowsky then described in his letter how the memorandum, owing to an indiscretion, got into circulation, and finally expressed lively regret at such an extremely vexatious incident.

Herr von Payer said that Prince Lichnow-

sky had meanwhile tendered his resignation of his present rank, which had been accepted, and as he had doubtless no bad intention, but had simply been guilty of imprudence, no further steps would be taken against him. The Vice Chancellor proceeded:

"Some assertions in his documents must, however, be contradicted, especially his assertions about political events in the last months preceding the war. Prince Lichnowsky was not of his own knowledge acquainted with these events, but he apparently received from a third, and wrongly informed quarter, inaccurate information. The key to the mistakes and false conclusions may also be the Prince's overestimation of his own services, which are accompanied by hatred against those who do not recognize his achievements as he expected. The entire memorandum is penetrated by a striking veneration for foreign diplomats, especially the British, who are described in a truly affectionate manner, and, on the other hand, by an equally striking irritation against almost all German statesmen. The result was that the Prince frequently regarded Germany's most zealous enemy as her best friend because they were personally on good terms with him.

"The fact that, as he admits, he attached at first no great importance to the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne, and was displeased that the situation was judged otherwise in Berlin, makes it plain that the Prince had no clear judgment for the events that followed and their import."

The Vice Chancellor then characterized as false all Prince Lichnowsky's assertions about General von Moltke's urging war at the Potsdam Crown Council of June 5, 1914, and the dispatch of the Austrian protocol on "this alleged Crown Council" to Count Mensdorff, containing the postscript that it would be no great harm even if war with Russia arose out of it.

Payer's Defense

Herr von Payer also denied the statement that the then Foreign Secretary was in Vienna in 1914, as well as the statement that Count von Pourtalès, the German Ambassador in Petrograd, had reported that Russia would in no circumstances move. The Sukhomlinoff trial had shown how unfounded were Prince Lichnowsky's reproaches against Germany for replying to the Russian mobilization by an ultimatum and a declaration of war. It was also false to assert that the German Government rejected all Great Britain's mediation proposals. Lord Grey's last mediation proposal was very urgently supported in Vienna by Berlin. The aim of the memorandum was obvious. It was to show the reader how much better and more intelligent Prince Lichnowsky's policy was, and how he could have assured the peace of the empire if his advice had been followed.

The Vice Chancellor continued:

"Nobody will reproach the Prince with this belief in himself. He was also free to make

notes about events, and his attitude toward them, but he should then have considered it a duty that his views should not have become known to the public, and, no matter how small his circle of readers was, it was his duty to state nothing contradicting facts which he knew. As things now are, the memorandum will cause enough harm among malevolent and superficial people. The memorandum has no historical value whatever."

Referring to a manifolded copy of a letter from Dr. Mühlton, who is at present in Switzerland, and at the outbreak of war was on Krupp's Board of Directors, Herr von Payer said that the letter related to the utterances of two highly placed gentlemen from which he drew the conclusion that the German Government in July, 1914, lacked a desire for peace. Both these gentlemen had stated in writing that Dr. Mühlton had suffered from nerves, and he (Herr von Payer) also took the view that his statements were those of a man of diseased mind.

In the discussion that followed, Herr Scheidemann said that the Socialist Party regarded imperialism as the fundamental cause of the war. Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum, in which he attempted to put the blame for the war on Germany, could, in his opinion, only make an impression on so-called out-and-out pacifists.

Herr Müller-Meiningen said that, notwithstanding what Dr. Mühlton and Prince Lichnowsky had said, he was absolutely convinced that the overwhelming majority of the German people, the Chancellor, and the representatives of the Foreign Office, and, above all, the German Emperor, always desired peace.

Herr Stresemann expressed a desire to see the last White Book supplemented. Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum could not be taken seriously.

Herr von Payer, intervening, said that the question as to whether criminal or disciplinary action might be taken against Prince Lichnowsky was considered by the Imperial Department of Justice. The result was that, on various legal grounds, neither a prosecution of the Prince for diplomatic high treason in the sense of Paragraph 92 of the Penal Code, nor proceedings under Paragraph 89 or Paragraph 353, the so-called *Arnim* paragraph, would have offered any chance of success. After the Prince's retirement, there was no longer any question of disciplinary proceedings against him. The Prince has been prohibited by the Foreign Office from publishing articles in the press.

Lichnowsky's "Optimism"

Herr von Stumm, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, replying to a question as to who was responsible for Prince Lichnowsky's appointment in London, said that the appointment was made by the Kaiser, in agreement with the responsible Imperial Chancellor. While in London the Prince had de-

voted himself zealously to his task. His views, it was true, had frequently not agreed with those of the German Foreign Office. That was especially the case regarding his strong optimism in reference to German-English relations. When his hopes aiming at a German-English understanding were destroyed by the war, the Prince returned to Germany greatly excited, and even then did not restrain his criticism of Germany's policy.

Herr von Stumm continued:

"His excitement increased owing to attacks against him in the German press. All these circumstances must be taken into consideration when gauging the value of his memorandum. It was unjustifiable to draw conclusions from it regarding the Ambassador's activity in London and blame the Government for it. Regarding the German White Book, the Under Secretary admitted that it was not very voluminous, but it had to be compiled quickly, so as to present to the Reichstag at the opening a clear picture of the question of guilt. The Blue Books of other States, it was true, were much more voluminous. The German White Book, however, differed from them in so far to its advantage as it contained no falsification. A new edition of the German White Book is in preparation."

Dr. Payer then discussed the revelations of Dr. Mühlön, at present in Switzerland. Dr. Mühlön, an ex-Director of Krupps, had made a statement according to which he had a conference with two exalted personages in

the latter half of July, 1914, from which it appeared that it was not the intention of the German Government to maintain peace. The Vice Chancellor alleged that Dr. Mühlön was suffering from neurasthenia at the time, and that no importance could be attached to his revelations, since the two gentlemen referred to had denied making the statements attributed to them.

In the subsequent discussion disapproval of Prince Lichnowsky's attitude was expressed, but some speakers urged the need for the reorganization of Germany's Diplomatic Service.

According to the report of the debate published in the Neues Wiener Journal, Herr von Payer himself acknowledged that prior to the war German diplomacy had made some bad blunders, and that reform was urgently needed. Herr Müller (Progressive) sharply criticised Herr von Flotow, who was German Ambassador in Rome at the beginning of the war, and charged him with having declared to the Marquis di San Giuliano, then Italian Foreign Minister, that there existed for Italy no *casus foederis*. Prince Bülow also came in for severe criticism.

A bill indicting Prince Lichnowsky for treason has been introduced into the Reichstag and is still pending at this writing. A dispatch from Geneva on April 21 stated that he was virtually a prisoner in his château in Silesia. According to the *Düsseldorfer Tageblatt* the Prince was under police surveillance because of the discovery of a plan for his escape to Switzerland.

Comments of German Publicists

IMMEDIATELY following the sending out by the semi-official Wolff Telegraph Bureau on March 19 of an account of the discussion in the Main Committee of the Reichstag on March 16 of the Lichnowsky memorandum, together with excerpts from that document, the editorial writers of the German newspapers began emptying vials of wrath upon the head of the former Ambassador in London. With the exception of the Socialists and a few Liberal newspapers, the press was practically a unit in condemning the Prince for his "treasonable and indiscreet acts" and in asserting that, although his "revelations" might be welcomed with shouts of joy in the allied countries, they would have no serious effect upon the fighting spirit of the German Nation.

In trying to explain what prompted Prince Lichnowsky to write his memorandum for "the family archives," nearly all the German editors lay great stress upon his alleged personal vanity and his resentment at seeing his efforts toward strengthening the bonds between England and Germany made a grim joke by the outbreak of the world war. The

Prince is also called a simple-minded person, completely taken in by the deceptive courtesy of the British diplomats and possessing none of the qualifications necessary to make him a profitable representative of the Kaiser at the Court of St. James's. All through the comments, from extreme Pan-German to socialistic, runs a vein of sarcastic criticism of the peculiar "ability" shown by the German Foreign Office in picking its Ambassadors.

All the Pan-German and annexationist papers take occasion to link up Prince Lichnowsky with Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, the former Imperial Chancellor, and make the latter responsible for the appointment of the "pacifist" Prince. In doing this they renew all their old charges of weakness and pacifism against the ex-Chancellor, and intimate that he may be the next German formerly occupying a high place in the Government to write memoranda for his family archives. Some of the papers did not wait to write regular editorials about the memorandum, but interlarded their reports of the meeting of the Reichstag Committee with sarcastic

comment and explanations. This was notably the case with the *Vossische Zeitung*, the leading exponent of reconciliation with Russia at the expense of Great Britain.

Reventlow Furious

Although it has since been cabled that the Imperial Government was considering taking action against Prince Lichnowsky, and that Captain Beerfelde, a member of the German General Staff, was under arrest for having aided in the distribution of manifolded copies of the memorandum, there was no general demand in the German press for the trial of the Prince on a charge of high treason. The exceptions were a few extreme Pan-German organs, led by Count zu Reventlow's *Deutsche Tageszeitung*. On the other hand, a few of the Socialist and Liberal papers cautiously remarked that, after all, although what the Prince said about the responsibility for the war was altogether too pro-Entente, it might help the movement in Germany for a negotiated peace.

Count zu Reventlow's article in the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* read, in part, as follows:

"When a former Ambassador, and an experienced diplomat and official besides, writes an article and gives it to some one else in these times, there is, in our opinion, no excuse. It is a case of high treason, and it makes little difference if here one might perhaps admit the view of its being high treason through negligence, because certainly no former diplomat and official ought to allow himself to be so negligent, and, furthermore, he must have known the great danger of his action, which, as has been said, was exclusively meant to be to his personal interest. Therefore, we cannot very well understand for what reasons the proper steps have not been taken already against Prince Lichnowsky. We use the characterization 'high treason' after due deliberation.

"Prince Lichnowsky should not have allowed a single piece of his article to have left his hands, for he was very well able to judge that its publication outside of the German Empire was bound to have the effect of a treasonable act. The German cause will not be made any worse because a former diplomat, completely enchanted by English ways and never in touch with the essence of the English policy, places himself on the side of the enemies of the German Empire."

The *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, the organ of the annexationist faction of the Centre Party, concluded its editorial thus:

"One thing must be emphasized, Liebknecht, Dittmann, and other traitors have been jailed because of their high treason. Lichnowsky wanted to show to the whole world with his memorandum that Germany had sought, wanted, and begun the war because some persons did not wish to have him, Prince Lichnowsky, enjoy the success of the Anglo-German friendship. And, in so doing,

Lichnowsky furnished our enemies with weapons, worked to our enemies' advantage. In time of war this is treason. The excuse that the fourteen copies that he had prepared were written only for his friends is ridiculous. Teodor Wolff of the Berliner *Tageblatt* is known to be one of Lichnowsky's most intimate friends. Who knows who the others may be! If a Social Democrat or an anarchist writes an inciting pamphlet in the form of a memorandum and doesn't distribute it himself, but lets his friends do it, is he then exempt from punishment? If a person commits high treason and does not circulate the document himself, but lets others do it, or at least does not take precautions to see that it is not distributed, does he go free? The German people will hardly understand the decision of the Imperial Department of Justice as just rendered in favor of Lichnowsky. Even at the last session of the Prussian House of Lords Prince Lichnowsky sat beside his friend Dernburg. Will he appear in the House of Lords again?"

Germania Waxed Sarcastic

Germania, speaking for the so-called moderate section of the Centre Party, called the Lichnowsky case "one of the most disturbing political events that we have experienced in the course of the war," and hoped that the courts would still have a chance to decide as to the Prince's guilt. The newspaper comment was, in general, spiced with much sarcastic comparison of the Lichnowsky case with the cases of Dr. Karl Liebknecht and Deputy Wilhelm Dittmann, and many remarks were passed regarding the difference between the treatment accorded to a member of the Prussian nobility and that suffered by commoners and representatives of the German working class. The Berliner *Lokal-Anzeiger*, in ending its comment as to the paeans of joy with which the enemy press would be sure to welcome the publication of the Lichnowsky indictment, added the following item of news:

"We learn on good authority, in the matter of the distribution of the Lichnowsky pamphlet, that in the beginning of February the police succeeded in seizing 2,000 copies of this pamphlet which the Neues Vaterland Society had had sent to it from South Germany through its business manager, Else Bruck. She, together with Henke, a bookseller, was placed under charges, but was acquitted by the court-martial, presumably because the court was not able to foresee the far-reaching result of the document."

Under the heading "The Blind Argus" the Bremer *Nachrichten* opined that the man who should have been using a thousand eyes in London in the interest of Germany was blind, and it referred to the Lichnowsky case as "the most gloomy chapter in the history of German diplomacy."

Prince Lichnowsky's aversion to the old

Triple Alliance drew much caustic criticism, especially from the Pan German press, and excerpts from the semi-official Vienna Fremdenblatt and other Austrian papers, indignantly repudiating the Prince's charge that the Dual Monarchy had always regarded Germany as a shield under which it could make raids upon the Near East and otherwise stir up trouble, were eagerly reprinted in Germany.

The Berlin Vorwärts, speaking for the pro-Government Socialists, said:

"The Ambassador returned with the feeling of a man who had seen his lifework knocked to pieces. No doubt he felt at that time not very different from us German Socialists who had also worked for reconciliation with France and England and now, in the face of the unchained elemental forces, had to recognize our impotence with gnashing of teeth. In Germany, Prince Lichnowsky, who had believed in the possibility of agreement as every toiler must believe in his work, was greeted with the scorn of the Pan-Germans, who asserted that he had allowed himself to be softsoaped by the English

and had never recognized their real intentions." * * *

"And who can deny that this pamphlet casts a deep shadow upon the German foreign policy before the war? They can say that everything that Lichnowsky writes is the result of a diseased imagination and that all is distorted and badly drawn. But this would merely mean that the most important Ambassadorial post that Germany had at her disposal was occupied by a fool and a blockhead. So, if one wishes to spare the German policy this compromising implication, the only thing to do is to take the memorandum and its author seriously and argue the points with him in an expert manner."

The Vorwärts concluded its comment by saying that, no matter how the war started, the German people were now determined to see that Germany was not defeated, but if Prince Lichnowsky's article would help the people of Germany to adopt a more conciliatory attitude toward England, and thus hasten a negotiated peace, it was worth reading. Comment of other Socialist papers was along the same lines.

Von Jagow's Two Replies to Lichnowsky

PRACTICALLY coincident with the giving out for publication on March 19, through the semi-official Wolff Telegraph Bureau, of an account of a discussion in the Main Committee of the Reichstag of the memorandum of the former Ambassador at London, together with substantial excerpts from the main chapters of his work, the German Government got in touch with Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when the war began, and asked him to write an article calculated to counteract the effect of the Lichnowsky revelations. Herr von Jagow hastened to accede to this request, but he merely made matters worse for the German Government by practically admitting the correctness of Prince Lichnowsky's assertion that England did not want war and that Berlin was aware of this.

Copies of German newspapers received here show that, while the journals of all factions were practically of one mind in reproaching the German Foreign Office for its lack of diplomatic ability, the Pan-German and militarist organs laid special stress upon the implication in the von Jagow article that Germany might have been willing to drop its alliance with Austria if it could have been sure of contracting one with England, and the Liberal and Socialist papers declared that it was no use insisting any longer that Great Britain was guilty of the wholesale bloodshed of the world war, and that now nothing really stood in the way of moving for a peace by agreement.

These comments were so sharp on both

sides that Herr von Jagow was soon moved to write another article defending his reply to Prince Lichnowsky and arguing that his statements regarding the Triple Alliance could by no means be interpreted as meaning that he would have been willing to abandon Austria-Hungary in favor of Great Britain. In this article, which was first printed in the Münchener Neueste Nachrichten, von Jagow says he cannot understand how these statements can be taken to mean that he was an opponent of the alliance with Austria and was considering a choice between Austria and England. He proceeds to defend his own policy by reference to the fact that Bismarck was not content with the Triple Alliance on the one hand, and the famous "Reinsurance Treaty" with Russia on the other hand, but in 1887 deliberately promoted agreements between Austria-Hungary, Italy, and England, with the object of "bringing England into a closer relationship to the Central European league and making her share its burdens." Bismarck's policy relieved Germany of some of her obligations, because "Austria-Hungary, supported by Italy and England, held the balance against Russia."

Then, as The London Times points out, carefully avoiding the history of the present Kaiser's reversal of Bismarck's policy and abandonment of the "Reinsurance Treaty" with Russia, von Jagow defends his attempts to make British policy serve Germany's purposes. It was "because of the isolation of the Triple Alliance, which had

come about in the course of years," that von Jagow "pursued a rapprochement with England." He did so, "not with any idea of putting England in the place of Austria-Hungary, but in order, by disposing of the Anglo-German antagonism, to move England to a different orientation of her policy." Germany "could not count upon Italy," and wanted other assistance in upholding Austria-Hungary in the Balkans against Russia. Herr von Jagow proceeds:

"The combination of England would have relieved us of the necessity of taking our stand alone, when the case arose, for Austria-Hungary against Russia. As was effected by the agreements of 1887, a part of our obligations would have been laid upon other shoulders. It is in this sense that I spoke of the possibility of the loosening and the dissolution of old unions which no longer satisfy all the conditions.

"The alliance with Austria-Hungary was the cornerstone of Bismarckian policy, and that it had to remain. The expansion of the alliance into the Triple Alliance, by taking in Italy, was a means of supplementing the Central European grouping of the powers; it was an 'auxiliary structure,' by means of which Bismarck aimed at a further guarantee of peace, especially as he intended thereby to check Italy's Irredentist policy. Threads then ran to England via Italy. These threads gave way later, and this caused a considerable change in the attitude of Italy.

Friendly to England

"A friendly attitude on the part of England toward the Triple Alliance—what Professor Hermann Oncken calls the moral extension of the Triple Alliance over the Channel—was the aim of our policy, and in this we were sure of the complete accord of our allies. I never thought that the agreements about Bagdad and the colonies would mean an immediate alteration of England's course in European policy. These agreements were to prepare the way for this change of course.

I was under no illusions about the difficulties which would still have to be overcome. But difficulties, and even resistance on the part of public opinion in one's own country, cannot prevent us from following a road that is seen to be right. The league between Germany and Austria-Hungary, supported by friendship with England, would have created a peace bloc of unassailable strength. The increasing Irredentism of Italy, her friction with Austria on the Adriatic, and the Russo-ophile and also Irredentist tendencies of Rumania, would have lost their importance. Then, in given circumstances, the Triple Alliance treaty might have been modified. The union with England would also have secured us against Russian aggression, and the obligations imposed upon us by our alliance would thereby have been diminished.

"The road to this goal was long. The calm development was crossed by the Serajevo murders, and in the fateful hour of August, 1914, the English Government—instead of keeping peace—preferred to join in the war against us. The English Government has probably since then been assailed by serious doubts as to whether its choice was right. In any case, it assumed a considerable share of the guilt for the bloodshed in Europe."

Herr von Jagow then denies that his scheme was inevitably doomed to failure, saying that the policy of England is more liable to adaptation and alteration than the policy of any other country, and that "more far-seeing statesmen than those who were intrusted with the fortunes of the Island Empire in 1914—think only of the Pitts, Disraelis, and Salisburys—held other views about the orientation of England toward Germany and Russia."

"As matters stand today, attempts to arrive at clearness about the respective parts played by our enemies at the outbreak of the war, and about the greater or less degrees of guilt belonging to each of them, can have only a historical value. England has made the cause of our enemies her own, and so she also shall be made to feel how Germany defends herself against her enemies."

Full Text of von Jagow's First Reply

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Herr von Jagow's first reply to Prince Lichnowsky, which was printed in the Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung March 23, follows:

SO far as it is possible, in general, I shall refrain from taking up the statements concerning the policy obtaining before my administration of the Foreign Office.

"I should like to make the following remarks about the individual points in the article:

"When I was named State Secretary in January, 1913, I regarded a German-English rapprochement as desirable and also believed an agreement attainable on the points where our interests touched or crossed each other. At all events, I wanted to try to work in this sense. A principal point for us was the Mesopotamia-Asia Minor question—the so-called Bagdad policy—as this had become for us a question of prestige. If England wanted to force us out there it certainly appeared to me that a conflict could hardly

be avoided. In Berlin I began, as soon as it was possible to do so, to negotiate over the Bagdad Railroad. We found a favorable disposition on the part of the English Government, and the result was the agreement that was almost complete when the world war broke out.

Colonial Questions

"At the same time the negotiations over the Portuguese colonies that had been begun by Count Metternich, (as German Ambassador at London,) continued by Baron Marschall, and reopened by Prince Lichnowsky were under way. I intended to carve the way later for further negotiations regarding other—for example, East Asiatic—problems, when what was in my opinion the most important problem, that of the Bagdad Railroad, should be settled, and an atmosphere of more confidence thus created. I also left the naval problem aside, as it would have been difficult to reach an early agreement over that matter, after past experiences.

"I can pass over the development of the Albanian problem, as it occurred before my term of office began. In general, however, I would like to remark that such far-reaching disinterestedness in Balkan questions as Prince Lichnowsky proposes does not seem possible to me. It would have contradicted the essential part of the alliance if we had completely ignored really vital interests of our ally. We, too, had demanded that Austria stand by us at Algeiras, and at that time Italy's attitude had caused serious resentment among us. Russia, although she had no interest at all in Morocco, also stood by France. Finally, it was our task, as the third member of the alliance, to support such measures as would render possible a settlement of the divergent interests of our allies and avoid a conflict between them.

"It further appeared impossible to me not to pursue a 'triple alliance policy' in matters where the interests of the allied powers touched each other. Then Italy would have been driven entirely into line with the Entente in questions of the Orient, and Austria handed over to the mercy of Russia, and the Triple Alliance would thus have really gone to pieces. And we, too, would not have been able to look after our interests in the Orient, if we did not have some support. And even Prince Lichnowsky does not deny that we had to represent great economic interests right there. But today economic interests are no longer to be separated from political interests.

"That the people 'in Petrograd wanted to see the Sultan independent' is an assertion that Prince Lichnowsky will hardly be able to prove; it would contradict every tradition of Russian policy. If we, furthermore, had not had at our command the influence at Constantinople founded by Baron Marschall, it would hardly have been possible

for us to defend our economic interests in Turkey in the desired way.

Russia and Germany

"When Prince Lichnowsky further asserts that we only 'drove Russia, our natural friend and best neighbor, into the arms of France and England through our Oriental and Balkan policy' he is in conflict with the historical facts. Only because Prince Gortschakoff [Russian Premier] was guiding Russian policy toward a rapprochement with a France lusting for revenge was Prince Bismarck induced to enter into the alliance with Austria-Hungary; through the alliance with Rumania he barred an advance of Russia toward the south. Prince Lichnowsky condemns the basic principles of Bismarck's policy. Our attempts to draw closer to Russia went to pieces—Ejörki proves it—or remained ineffective, like the so-called Potsdam agreement. Also, Russia was not always our 'best neighbor.' Under Queen Elizabeth, as at present, she strove for possession of East Prussia to extend her Baltic coasts and to insure her domination of the Baltic. The Petrograd 'window' has gradually widened, so as to take in Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, and Finland and reach after Aland. Poland was arranged to be a field over which to send troops against us. Pan-Slavism, which was dominating the Russian policy to an ever greater degree, had positive anti-German tendencies.

"And we did not force Russia to drop 'her policy of Asiatic expansion,' but only tried to defend ourselves against her encroachments in European policy and her encircling of our Austro-Hungarian ally.

Grey Conciliatory

"Just as little as Sir Edward Grey [British Foreign Secretary] did we want war to come over Albania. Therefore, in spite of our unhappy experience at Algeiras, we agreed to a conference. The credit of an 'attitude of mediation' at the conference should not be denied Sir Edward Grey; but that he 'by no means placed himself on the side of the Entente' is, however, surely saying rather too much. Certainly he often advised yielding in Petrograd (as we did in Vienna) and found 'formulas of agreement,' but in dealing with the other side he represented the Entente, because he, no less than ourselves, neither would, nor could, abandon his associates. That we, on the other hand, 'without exception, represented the standpoint dictated to us from Vienna' is absolutely false. We, like England, played a mediatory rôle, and also in Vienna counseled far more yielding and moderation than Prince Lichnowsky appears to know about, or even to suggest. And then Vienna made several far-reaching concessions, (Dibra, Djakowa.) If Prince Lichnowsky, who always wanted to be wiser than the Foreign Office, and who apparently

allowed himself to be strongly influenced by the Entente statesmen, did not know this, he surely ought not to make any false assertions now! If, to be sure, the degree of yielding that was necessary was reached in Vienna, we also naturally had to represent the Austrian standpoint at the conference. Ambassador Szögyeni himself was not one of the extremists; in Vienna they were by no means always satisfied with his attitude. That the Ambassador, with whom I was negotiating almost every day, constantly sounded the refrain of *casus foederis* is entirely unknown to me. It certainly is true that Prince Lichnowsky for some time past had not been counted as a friend of Austria in Vienna. Still complaints about him came to my ears oftener from the side of Marquis San Giuliano [Italian Foreign Minister] than from the side of Count Berchtold, [Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister.]

"King Nicholas's seizure of Scutari constituted a mockery of the entire conference and a snub to all the powers taking part in it.

"Russia was by no means obliged 'to give way to us all along the line'; on the contrary, she 'advanced the wishes of Serbia' in several ways, Serbia even receiving some cities and strips of territory that could have been regarded as purely Albanian or preponderatingly so. Prince Lichnowsky says that 'the course of the conference was a fresh humiliation for the self-consciousness of Russia' and that there was a feeling of resentment in Russia on that account. It cannot be the task of our policy to satisfy all the unjustified demands of the exaggerated self-consciousness of a power by no means friendly to us, at the cost of our ally. Russia has no vital interests on the Adriatic, but our ally certainly has. If we, as Prince Lichnowsky seems to wish, had flatly taken the same stand as Russia, the result would have been a humiliation for Austria-Hungary and thus a weakening of our group. Prince Lichnowsky seems only anxious that Russia be not humiliated; a humiliation of Austria is apparently a matter of indifference to him.

The "Wily" Venizelos

"When Prince Lichnowsky says that our 'Austrophilie' was not adapted to 'promote Russia's interests in Asia,' I don't exactly understand what this means. Following a disastrous diversion toward East Asia—in the Japanese war we had favored Russia without even being thanked for it!—Russia again took up her policy directed toward the European Orient (the Balkans and Constantinople) with renewed impulse, (the Balkan Alliance, Buchlau, Iswolsky, &c.) [Iswolsky retired as Russian Foreign Minister after Germany forced the Czar to repudiate his Serbian policy in 1900.]

"Venizelos, the cunning Cretan with the 'Ribbon of the Order of the Red Eagle,' evidently knew how to throw a little sand into

the eyes of our Ambassador. He, in contrast to King Constantine and Theototy, always was pro-Entente. His present attitude reveals his feelings as clearly as can be. Herr Danef, however, was entirely inclined toward Petrograd.

"That Count Berchtold displayed certain inclinations toward Bulgaria also in its differences with Rumania is true; that we 'naturally went with him' is, however, entirely false. With our support, King Carol had the satisfaction of the Bucharest peace. [Ended second Balkan war.] If, therefore, in the case of the Bucharest peace, in which we favored the wishes and interests of Rumania, which was allied to us, our policy deviated somewhat from that of Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet certainly did not believe—as Prince Lichnowsky asserts—that it 'could count upon our support in case of its revision.' That Marquis San Giuliano 'is said to have warned us already in the Summer of 1913 from becoming involved in a world war,' because at that time in Austria 'the thought of a campaign against Serbia' had found entrance, is entirely unknown to me. Just as little do I know that Herr von Tschirschky—who certainly was rather pessimistic by nature—is said to have declared in the Spring of 1914 that there soon would be war. Therefore, I was just as ignorant of the 'important happenings' that Prince Lichnowsky here suspects as he was himself! Such events as the English visit to Paris—Sir Edward Grey's first to the Continent—surely must have been known to the Ambassador, and we informed him about the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement; to be sure, he did not want to believe it!

"In the matter of Liman von Sander, [German reorganizer of the Turkish Army,] we made a far-reaching concession to Russia by renouncing the General's power of command over Constantinople. I will admit that this point of the agreement over the military mission was not opportune politically.

"When Prince Lichnowsky boasts of having succeeded in giving the treaty a form corresponding to our wishes, this credit must not be denied him, although it certainly required strong pressure on several occasions to induce him to represent some of our desires with more emphasis.

"When Prince Lichnowsky says that he received the authorization definitely to conclude the treaty, after he previously asserts that 'the treaty was consequently dropped,' this contains a contradiction which we may let the Prince straighten out. Lichnowsky's assertion, however, that we delayed publication because the treaty would have been 'a public success' for him that we begrudged him, is an unheard-of insinuation that can only be explained through his self-centred conception of things. The treaty would have lost its practical and moral effect—one of its main objects was to create a good atmosphere between us and England—if its publication had been greeted with violent attacks

upon 'perfidious Albion' in our Anglophobe press and in our Parliament. And there is no doubt that, in view of our internal position at that time, this is what the simultaneous publication of the so-called Windsor Treaty would have caused. And the howl about English perfidy that the internal contradiction between the text of the Windsor Treaty and our treaty would doubtless have called forth would hardly have been stilled in the minds of our public through the assurance of English bona fides.

"Untenable" Charges

"With justified precaution, we intended to allow the publication to be made only at the proper moment, when the danger of disapproving criticism was no longer so acute, if possible simultaneously with the announcement of the Bagdad Treaty, which also was on the point of being concluded. The fact that two great agreements had been concluded between us and England would doubtless have materially favored their reception and made it easier to overlook the aesthetic defects of the Portuguese agreement. It was consideration for the effect of the agreement—with which we wanted to improve our relations with England, not to generate more trouble—that caused our hesitation.

"It is correct that—although in a secondary degree—consideration was also taken of the efforts just then being made to obtain economic interests in the Portuguese colonies, which the publication of the agreement would naturally have made more difficult to realize. These conditions Prince Lichnowsky may not have been able to perceive fully from London, but he should have trusted in our objective judgment and acquiesced in it, instead of replacing his lack of understanding with suspicions and the interjection of personal motives. He certainly would have found our arguments understood by the English statesmen themselves.

"The Ambassador's speeches aroused considerable adverse sentiment in this country. It was necessary for the creation of a better atmosphere, in which alone the rapprochement being worked for could flourish, that confidence in our English policy and in our London Ambassador be spread also among our people at home. Prince Lichnowsky, otherwise so susceptible to public opinion, did not take this motive sufficiently into account, for he saw everything only through his London spectacles. The charges against the attitude of the Foreign Office are too untenable to be bothered with. I would only like to point out that Prince Lichnowsky was not left in ignorance regarding the 'most important things,' in so far as they were of value to his mission. On the contrary, I gave the Ambassador much more general information than used to be the custom. My own experiences as Ambassador induced me to do so. But with Lichnowsky there was the inclination to rely

more upon his own impressions and judgment than upon the information and advice of the Central Office. To be sure, I did not always have either the motive or the authority to impart the sources of our news. Here there were quite definite considerations, particularly anxiety regarding the compromising of our sources. The Prince's memorandum furnishes the best justification for the caution exercised in this regard.

Defense of Archduke

"It is not true that in the Foreign Office the reports that England would protect France under all circumstances were not believed.

"At Knopischt, on the occasion of the visit of his Majesty the Kaiser to the Archduke heir apparent, no plan of an active policy against Serbia was laid down. Archduke Franz Ferdinand was not at all the champion of a policy leading to war for which he has often been taken. During the London conference he advised moderation and the avoidance of war.

"Prince Lichnowsky's 'optimism' was hardly justified, as he has probably convinced himself since through the revelations of the Sukhomlinoff trial. Besides, the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement (of which, as said before, he was informed) should have made him more skeptical. Unfortunately, the suspicion voiced by the Imperial Chancellor and the Under Secretary of State was well grounded. How does this agree with the assertion that we, relying upon the reports of Count Pourtalès that 'Russia would not move under any circumstances,' had not thought of the possibility of a war? Furthermore, so far as I can recollect, Count Pourtalès [German Ambassador at St. Petersburg] never made such reports.

Blame for Russia

"That Austria-Hungary wished to proceed against the constant provocations stirred up by Russia, (Herr von Hartwig,) which reached their climax in the outrage of Serajevo, we had to recognize as justified. In spite of all the former settlements and avoidances of menacing conflicts, Russia did not abandon her policy, which aimed at the complete exclusion of the Austrian influence (and naturally ours also) from the Balkans. The Russian agents, inspired by Petrograd, continued their incitement. It was a question of the prestige and the existence of the Danube Monarchy. It must either put up with the Russo-Serbian machinations, or command a quos ego, even at the risk of war. We could not leave our ally in the lurch. Had the intention been to exclude the ultima ratio of the war in general, the alliance should not have been concluded. Besides, it was plain that the Russian military preparations, (for instance, the extension of the railroads and forts in Poland,) for which a France lusting for revenge had lent the money and which would have been completed in a few years,

were directed principally against us. But despite all this, despite the fact that the aggressive tendency of the Russian policy was becoming more evident from day to day, the idea of a preventive war was far removed from us. We only decided to declare war on Russia in the face of the Russian mobilization and to prevent a Russian invasion.

"I have not the letters exchanged with the Prince at hand—it was a matter of private letters. Lichnowsky pleaded for the abandonment of Austria. I replied, so far as I remember, that we, aside from our treaty obligation, could not sacrifice our ally for the uncertain friendship of England. If we abandoned our only reliable ally later we would stand entirely isolated, face to face with the Entente. It is likely that I also wrote that 'Russia was constantly becoming more anti-German' and that we must 'just risk it.' Furthermore, it is possible that I, in order to steel Lichnowsky's nerves a little and to prevent him from exposing his views also in London, may also have written that there would probably be some 'bluster'; that 'the more firmly we stood by Austria the sooner Russia would yield.' I have said already that our policy was not based upon alleged reports excluding war; certainly at that time I still thought war could be avoided, but, like all of us, I was fully aware of the very serious danger.

"We could not agree to the English proposal of a conference of Ambassadors, for it would doubtless have led to a serious diplomatic defeat. For Italy, too, was pro-Serb and, with her Balkan interests, stood rather opposed to Austria. The 'intimacy of the Russo-Italian relations' is admitted by Prince Lichnowsky himself. The best and only feasible way of escape was a localization of the conflict and an understanding between Vienna and Petrograd. We worked toward that end with all our energy. That we 'insisted upon' the war is an unheard-of assertion which is sufficiently invalidated by the telegrams of his Majesty the Kaiser to the Czar and to King George, published in the White Books—Prince Lichnowsky only cares to tell about 'the really humble telegram of the Czar'—as well as the instruction we sent to Vienna. The worst caricature is formed by the sentence:

"When Count Berchtold finally decided to come around we answered the Russian mobilization, after Russia had vainly negotiated and waited a whole week, with the ultimatum and the declaration of war."

[In quoting Lichnowsky, Herr von Jagow omits the former's statement that Count Berchtold "hitherto had played the strong man on instructions from Berlin."]

"Wrong" Conclusions

"Should we, perhaps, have waited until the mobilized Russian Army was streaming over our borders? The reading of the Sukhomlinov trial has probably given even Prince Lichnowsky a feeling of 'Oh si

tacuisse!' On July 5 I was absent from Berlin. The declaration that I was 'shortly thereafter in Vienna' 'in order to talk everything over with Count Berchtold' is false. I returned to Berlin on July 6 from my honeymoon trip and did not leave there until Aug. 15, on the occasion of the shifting of the Great Headquarters. As Secretary of State I was only once in Vienna before the war, in the Spring of 1913.

"Prince Lichnowsky lightly passed over the matter of the confusing dispatch that he sent us on Aug. 1—at present I am not in possession of the exact wording—as a 'misunderstanding' and even seems to want to reproach us because 'in Berlin the news, without first waiting for the conversation, was made the basis of a far-reaching action.' The question of war with England was a matter of minutes, and immediately after the arrival of the dispatch it was decided to make an eleventh-hour attempt to avoid war with France and England. His Majesty sent the well-known telegram to King George. The contents of the Lichnowsky dispatch could not have been understood any other way than we understood it.

"Objectively taken, the statement of Prince Lichnowsky presents such an abundance of inaccuracies and distortions that it is hardly a wonder that his conclusions are also entirely wrong. The reproach that we sent an ultimatum on July 30 to Petrograd merely because of the mobilization of Russia and on July 31 declared war upon the Russians, although the Czar had pledged his word that not a man should march so long as negotiations were under way, thus willfully destroying the possibility of a peaceful adjustment, has really a grotesque effect. In concluding, the statement seems almost to identify itself with the standpoint of our enemies.

"When the Ambassador makes the accusation that our policy identified itself 'with Turks and Austro-Magyars' and 'subjected itself to the viewpoints of Vienna and Budapest,' he may be suitably answered that he saw things only through London spectacles and from the narrow point of view of his desired rapprochement with England à tout prix. He also appears to have forgotten completely that the Entente was formed much more against us than against Austria.

"I, too, pursued a policy which aimed at an understanding with England, because I was of the opinion that this was the only way for us to escape from the unfavorable position in which we were placed by the unequal division of strength and the weakness of the Triple Alliance. But Russia and France insisted upon war. We were obligated through our treaty with Austria, and our position as a great power was also threatened—hic Rhodus, hic salta. But England, that was not allied in the same way with Russia and that had received far-reaching assurances from us regarding the sparing of France and Belgium, seized the sword.

"In saying this, I by no means share the opinion prevalent among us today that England laid all the mines for the outbreak of the war; on the contrary, I believe in Sir Edward Grey's love of peace and in his earnest wish to arrive at an agreement with us. But he had allowed himself to become entangled too far in the net of the Franco-Russian policy; he no longer found the way out, and he did not prevent the world war—something that he could have done. Neither was the war popular with the English people; Belgium had to serve as a battle cry.

"Political marriages for life and death' are, as Prince Lichnowsky says, not possible in international unions. But neither is isolation, under the present condition of affairs in Europe. The history of Europe consists of coalitions that sometimes have led to the avoidance of warlike outbreaks and sometimes to violent clashes. A loosening and dissolving of old alliances that no longer correspond to all conditions is only in order when new constellations are attainable. This was the object of the policy of a rapprochement with England. So long as this policy did not offer reliable guarantees we could not abandon the old guarantees—even with their obligations.

German Comments on von Jagow's Views

IN commenting upon Herr von Jagow's reply to Prince Lichnowsky, Georg Bernhard, editor in chief of the *Vossische Zeitung*, took occasion to re-emphasize his favorite theory of a rapprochement with Russia so as to enable Germany to reduce Great Britain to the level of a second-class power. In a long article, printed on March 31, Herr Bernhard asserted that Prince Lichnowsky had been by no means alone in his policy of seeking agreement with England as Herr von Jagow himself had admitted, and that the German Foreign Office had seemed obsessed with the idea that it was a question of a choice between Austria and England, when, in reality, if the diplomats had wanted to pursue a good German policy and at the same time be of service to Austria, they should have made it a question of Russia or England and tried to establish good relations with the former under all circumstances. After quoting von Jagow's remark about the inadvisability of abandoning old alliances until new constellations were attainable, Herr Bernhard said:

"We shall not go into the question here if, during this war, which strains all the forces of the alliance to the utmost, a former German Secretary of State should have written such sentences. It is incomprehensible how they came from the pen of a sensible man—and Herr von Jagow is such a one. And it is still more incomprehensible how they were able to escape the attention

"The Morocco policy had led to a political defeat. In the Bosnian crisis this had been luckily avoided, the same as at the London Conference. A fresh diminution of our prestige was not endurable for our position in Europe and in the world. The prosperity of States, their political and economic successes, are based upon the prestige that they enjoy in the world.

"The personal attacks contained in the work, the unheard-of calumnies and slanders of others, condemn themselves. The ever-recurring suspicion that everything happened only because it was not desired to allow him, Lichnowsky, any successes speaks of wounded self-love, of disappointed hopes for personal successes, and has a painful effect.

"In closing, let us draw attention here to what Hermann Oncken has also quoted in his work, 'The Old and New Central Europe,' the memorandum of Prince Bismarck of the year 1879, in which the idea is developed that the German Empire must never dare allow a situation in which it would remain isolated on the European Continent between Russia and France, side by side with a defeated Austria-Hungary that had been left in the lurch by Germany."

of the Foreign Office. Fortunately, they can no longer do any harm now, as through our deeds we have demonstrated our loyalty to the Austrians and Hungarians better than it can be done by any amount of talk."

In an earlier editorial Herr Bernhard referred as follows to von Jagow's admission that he did not believe that England had laid all the mines leading to the world war:

"In spite of all experiences, therefore, here is another—almost official—attempt made to represent the war as merely the result of the aggressive desires of France and Russia. As if France (through whose population went a shudder of fear as it saw itself on the edge of the abyss of war) would ever have dared to go to war without knowing that England stood back of her! And were Edward's trips to Paris without any effect upon our diplomats? Has it not also finally become sufficiently well known through the reports of the Belgian Ambassador how France repeatedly tried to escape from the alliance, but was always again forced into the net by Nicolson, [former British Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs,] through Edward? The Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, himself admitted in the Reichstag the harmful rôle of King Edward. Only he, as probably did Herr von Jagow also, thought that Edward's death put an end to the policy of encircling. But this policy of encircling—and here is where the mistake entailing seri-

ous consequences is made by our diplomats—was not at all merely a personal favorite idea of Edward VII., but the continuation of the traditional English policy toward the strongest Continental power."

Herr Bernhard then asserted that England desired the publication of the proposed Anglo-German treaty regarding the division of the Portuguese colonies into spheres of economic interests so as to make Portugal's eventual support of the Entente all the surer, and continued:

Thanks for Hindenburg

"And Lichnowsky wanted to fall into this trap set by England. It was avoided by the Foreign Office more through instinct than sagacity. And these diplomats have guided Germany's destiny before and during the war! Let us give the warmest thanks to Hindenburg because his sword has now, it is to be hoped, put an end once for all to the continued spinning of plans by such and similar diplomats even during the war."

Teodor Wolff, editor in chief of the Berliner Tageblatt, probably the leading organ of the German business elements and liberal politicians who were opposed to the war from the beginning, and who still hope for a negotiated peace that will facilitate an early resumption of trade relations with Great Britain and the rest of the allies, expressed the hope that the "battle of minds will finally create a clearer atmosphere," and then remarked:

"Only quite incidentally would I like to allow myself to direct the attention of Herr von Jagow to an erroneous expression that appears twice in his reply. Herr von Jagow writes: 'We informed him [Lichnowsky] of the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement,' and in another place: 'The secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement might also have made him a little more skeptical.' Only the day before, on Saturday, it was said in an article of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, also directed against Lichnowsky: 'Negotiations were pending with Russia over a naval agreement that the Prince characteristically passes over in silence.' In reality, although hasty historians also speak without further ceremony of a treaty, it is manifest that no Anglo-Russian agreement existed; there was merely a Russian proposal, and the most that can be said is that 'negotiations were pending.' * * *

"His [von Jagow's] remark, 'It is not true that the Foreign Office did not believe the reports that England would protect France under all circumstances,' is in contradiction with the well-known report of the then English Ambassador, Goschen, which describes into what surprise and consternation Herr von Bethmann and Herr von Jagow were thrown by the news of the English declaration of war."

In beginning his comment upon von Jagow,

Herr Wolff threw a little more light upon the way in which Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum "for the family archives" got into more or less general secret circulation in Germany before it was printed by the Swedish Socialist paper Politiken last March, and also described the character of Captain Beerfelde, the member of the German General Staff who, according to some cabled reports, is to be tried for his part in distributing copies of the memorandum.

Herr Wolff said that Prince Lichnowsky had had five or six copies made, of which he had sent one to Wolff, one to Albert Ballin, head of the Hamburg-American line, and another to Arthur von Gwinner, head of the Deutsche Bank. All of these persons carefully hid the "dangerous gift" in the deepest recesses of their writing desks, but a fourth copy went astray and got into hands for which it had not been intended, and from these hands passed into those of still another individual. Then the editor wrote:

How Manuscript Became Public

"I made the acquaintance some years before the war of the officer who obtained the memorandum 'on loan,' and sent copies of it to State officials and politicians. He belongs to an old noble family, was treated with sympathy by General von Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff, occupied himself enthusiastically with religious philosophy or theosophy, and was a thoroughly manly but mystic person. * * * After hard war experiences, he felt the longing to serve the dictates of peace with complete devotion, and he surrendered himself to a pacifism which is absolutely incompatible with the uniform.

"Late one evening he visited me in a state of great excitement, and told me that he had manifolded a memorandum by Prince Lichnowsky which had been lent to him, and that, without asking the author, he had sent it to the 'leading men.' It was impossible to convince him by any logic or on any grounds of reason that his action was wrong, senseless, and harmful. He was a Marquis Posa, or, still more, a Horatius Cocles, who, out of love for Rome or for mankind, sprang into the abyss."

The Berlin Vorwärts, the leading organ of the pro-Government Socialists, began its editorial on the von Jagow reply by remarking that the article of the former State Secretary for Foreign Affairs was hardly calculated to convince the reader that Prince Lichnowsky's self-esteem was the only thing that had had a "painful effect" upon the German people in July, 1914, and since that time. It then said that "Herr von Jagow agrees with Lichnowsky upon the decisive point!" quoted what von Jagow had said about his desire for an Anglo-German rapprochement, and continued:

"These words show that, in 1913, the Wilhelmstrasse and the London Embassy were in the complete harmony of common beliefs

and intentions. Herr von Jagow, exactly like Lichnowsky, exactly like Bethmann, and exactly like Wilhelm II., believed in the possibility of creating 'an atmosphere of confidence,' as Jagow says, between Germany and England, through a series of agreements, of which those regarding the Bagdad Railroad and Africa were to have been the first."

Vorwärts then proceeded to point out that the Albanian crisis had strengthened this faith instead of weakening it, took up von Jagow's reasons for Germany's refusal to have the proposed Anglo-German agreement on the Portuguese African colonies published, and exclaimed:

"What a fear of Tirpitz! A disturbing of the new relations through his intrigues and the howling of his jingo press was to be avoided through an affectation of secrecy. But three weeks later the war with England was here and the Pan-German sheets welcomed 'the longed-for day!' What had happened in the meantime? Of course, 'perfidious Albion' (even Jagow puts quotation marks on these words) had in the meantime thrown off the mask and revealed her perfidy! Let's hear what—after Lichnowsky—Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in July, 1914, has to say about it!"

Then Vorwärts quoted Jagow's description of how the war began, and went on:

"All that remains of the accusations against the English Government is that it did not prevent the world war, 'although it could have done so.' Now Herr von Jagow also did not prevent the world war, but he must certainly be acquitted of the charge that he could have prevented it. He really could not, and so an emphatic statement of inability is the best excuse for him and his fellow-disputants.

"Let us establish the facts. England did not desire the war; she merely did not prevent it. The war was not popular in England; it also was not popular in Russia and France. But it has become popular. The whole world—right away across the Atlantic and the Pacific—is united in hatred against us. We, however, have for almost four years been inoculated with the view that 'England laid all the mines which caused the war'—a view which the Secretary of State, in accordance with the evidence of the Ambassador, has now declared to be false! It is, however, by this false view that the whole war policy of the German Empire has been directed—from the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare, which brought us war with America, down to those Chancellor speeches which say that Belgium must not again become England's area of military concentration.

"If all the parties concerned were convinced that the belief in England's guilt is a fiction, why did they feed this belief, and why did they pursue a policy which was based upon it? They ought rather to have appointed to the Chancellorship Tirpitz, who, perhaps, believes what he says. Instead of that, a policy of fear of Tirpitz has been pursued. Sometimes a policy against Tirpitz has been attempted, but it has always been reversed at decisive moments, out of fear of the nationalistic terror.

"This fear was, perhaps, not entirely unfounded, for agitation is unscrupulous. The older ones among us still remember very well 'an Englishwoman' who was very unpopular in many circles, but this Englishwoman was the mother of the German Kaiser. No doubt there was no more convenient method for the Government to guard the dynasty than for it to take part in, or at least to tolerate, the agitation against the English. This was the only way of preventing the agitation from turning ultimately against the wearer of the German imperial crown. But ought such intimate considerations to have been permitted to play a part when the fate of the nations was at stake?

"Let us put an end to this! At this moment we are in a battle which may be decisive and which is going in favor of the empire. But even after this battle we shall possess neither the possibility nor the moral right to treat our opponent according to the principle of 'With thumbs in his eyes and knee on his breast.' Even after the greatest military successes there exists the necessity for political negotiation. It will be easier for us to enter into this negotiation after the poisonous fog of the war lies shall have lifted. Now that Herr von Jagow has cleared up the rôle played by England at the beginning of the war, there is nothing in the way of the fulfillment of the promise made by Bethmann to 'make good the wrong committed against Belgium'!

"If it is perhaps true that everything Wilhelm II., Bethmann, von Jagow, and Lichnowsky thought was true up to three weeks before the outbreak of the war was false, then let the mistake be acknowledged and the conservative Pan-Germans be put openly in the Government, so that they, both within and without, may complete the work of a peace by force. But if this is neither desirable nor possible, then there is nothing left to do but to take a decided step ahead. For the German people cannot be satisfied with the methods of governing exercised before and during the war. * * * The German people can only endure after the war as a peace-loving nation that governs itself."

Lichnowsky's Testimony as to Germany's Long Plotting for Domination

By H. Charles Woods, F. R. G. S.

TO a Britisher who has followed the trend of events in the Near East, and who has witnessed the gradual development of German intrigues in that area, there has never been published a document so important and so condemnatory of Germany as the disclosures of Prince Lichnowsky.

On the one hand, the memorandum of the Kaiser's ex-Ambassador in London proves from an authoritative enemy pen that, practically ever since the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, and particularly from the time of the accession of the present Emperor to the throne in 1888, the Germans have carefully prepared the way for the present war, and that during this period they have consistently turned their attention toward the East and toward the development of the Mitteleuropa scheme. And on the other side it indicates, if indeed any indication were still required, that the so-called rivalry existing between England and Germany prior to the war arose not from any desire on the part of Great Britain to stand in the way of the development of legitimate German interests in the Balkans and in Asia Minor, but from the unwillingness of the Government of Berlin to agree to any reasonable settlement of the many all-important questions connected with these regions.

Although for years the Germans had been intriguing against the Triple Entente, Prince Lichnowsky, a man possessed of personally friendly feelings for England, was sent to London in order to camouflage the real designs of the enemy and to secure representation by a diplomatist who was intended to make good, and who, in fact, did make a high position for himself in British official and social circles. The appointment itself raises two interesting questions. In the first place, while this is not stated in the memorandum, it is clear that, whereas Baron Marschall von Bieberstein was definitely instructed to endeavor to make friends with England and to detach her from France and Russia, or, if this were impossible, to bring about war at a convenient time for Germany, Prince Lichnowsky's task was somewhat different. Kept at least more or less in the dark as to German objects, the Ambassador, who arrived in London when the Morocco crisis of 1911 was considered at an end, instead of being intrusted with the dual objects of his predecessor, was clearly told to do, and did in fact do, his utmost to establish friendly relations with England. The Berlin Government, on the other hand, this time maintained in its own hands the larger question of the making of war at what it

believed, happily wrongly, to be a convenient time for the Central Empires. In the second place, although this, too, is not explained, various references made by Prince Lichnowsky leave little doubt in the mind of the reader who knows the situation existing at the German Embassy prior to the outbreak of war that the Ambassador himself was aware that von Kühlmann—the Councilor of Embassy—was, in fact, the representative of Pan-Germanism in England, and that to this very able and expert intriguer was left the work of trying to develop a situation which, in peace or in war, would be favorable to the ruler and to the class whose views he voiced.

Phases of German Policy

To come down to the real subject of this article—the proof provided by Prince Lichnowsky's disclosures of the long existence of the German Mitteleuropa scheme and of the fact that Germany, and not Austria, made this war, largely with the object of pushing through her designs in the East—I propose to divide my remarks in such a way as to show that the development of this scheme passed through three phases and in each case to take what may be called a text from the document under discussion.

The first phase lasted from the Congress of Berlin of 1878, when Prince Lichnowsky says that Germany began the Triple Alliance policy, and more definitely from the accession of the present Emperor to the throne in 1888 until the Balkan wars. While in using these expressions the ex-Ambassador does not refer only to this period, he says: "The goal of our political ambition was to dominate in the Bosphorus," and "instead of encouraging a powerful development in the Balkan States, we placed ourselves on the side of the Turkish and Magyar oppressors."

These words contain in essence and in tabulated form an explanation (from the pen of a German whose personal and official positions enabled him to know the truth) of the events which were in progress during this period—events the full importance of which has often been refuted and denied by those who refused to see that from the first the Kaiser was obsessed by a desire for domination from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. Indeed, from the moment of his accession the sentiments and views of the German ruler became markedly apparent, for one year later his Majesty paid the first of his carpet-bagging visits to Constantinople—a visit more or less connected with the then

recent grabbing of Haidar Pasha-Ismid railway—now the first section of the Bagdad line—by the Germans, and with the prolongation of that line to Angora as a German concern, concessions secured by Mr. Kaula, acting on behalf of German interests in 1888.

Preparing for Pan-German Project

Before and particularly after the appointment of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, who had then been a personal friend of the Kaiser for many years, the enemy had been carefully preparing the way for the realization of his Pan-German dreams in the Near and Middle East. Although so far as the Balkan States were concerned, up to the outbreak of the war the Kaiser endeavored to screen his intentions behind a nominally Austrian program, for years he had really been making ready his ground for the present occasion by military, political, and economic penetration and by diplomatic intrigues destined to bring about a favorable situation for Germany when the propitious moment for action arrived. The power of von der Goltz Pasha, who introduced the present military system into Turkey in 1886, and of his pupils was gradually increased until the Ottoman Army was finally placed completely under Germanic control.

The Young Turkish revolution of 1908, which at first seemed destined greatly to minimize German power at Constantinople, really resulted in an opposite effect. Thus in spite of the effective support of England for Turkey during the Bosnian and Bulgarian crises of 1908 and 1909, a gradual reaction subsequently set in. This was due in part to the cleverness and regardlessness of von Bieberstein, and in part to the circumstances arising out of the policy adopted by the Young Turks. For instance, while the Germans ignored the necessity for reforms in the Ottoman Empire so long as the Turks favored a Teutonic program, it was impossible for the British Government or the British public to look with favor upon a régime which worked to maintain the privileged position of Moslems throughout the empire, which did nothing to punish those who instigated the massacre of the Armenians of Cilicia in 1909, and which was intent upon disturbing the status quo in the Persian Gulf, and upon changing the status of Egypt to the Turkish advantage.

The Turco-German Entente

Such indeed became the position that even the Turco-Italian war, which might have been expected to shake the confidence of the Ottoman Government in the bona fides of Italy's then ally, did not seriously disturb the intimate relations which were gradually developing between Berlin and Constantinople. Here again enemy intrigues were to the fore, for in addition to Austria's objecting to the inauguration of any Italian operations in the Balkans, the German Government, when the position of its representative in Constan-

tinople had become seriously compromised as a result of the Italian annexation of Tripoli, which he could not prevent, suddenly found it convenient to transfer von Bieberstein to London and to replace him by another, perhaps less able, but certainly none the less successful in retaining a grasp over everything which took place in the Ottoman capital.

Before and particularly after the accession of the Kaiser to the throne, the Germans gradually furthered their program by a system of railway penetration in the East. In the late '60s Baron Hirsch secured a concession for the construction of lines from Constantinople to what was then the northwestern frontier of Eastern Rumelia, and from Saloniki to Mitrovitza, with a branch to Ristovatz on the then Serbian frontier. At first these lines were under French influence, but they subsequently became largely an Austrian undertaking, and considerably later the Deutsche Bank secured a predominating proportion of the capital, thus turning them practically into a German concern. In Asia Minor the British, who were originally responsible for the construction of railways, were gradually ousted, until, with the signature of the Bagdad Railway agreement in 1903, the Germans dominated not only that line, but also occupied a position in which, on the one hand, they had secured control of many of its feeders, and, on the other, they had jeopardized the future development and even the actual prosperity of those not already in their possession.

Fruits of the Balkan Wars

This brings us up to the second phase in the development of Pan-Germanism in the East—the period of the Balkan wars—toward two aspects of which, as Prince Lichnowsky says, the Central Powers devoted their attention. "Two possibilities for settling the question remained." Either Germany left the Near Eastern problem to the peoples themselves or she supported her allies "and carried out a Triple Alliance policy in the East, thereby giving up the rôle of mediator." Once more, in the words of the Prince himself, "The German Foreign Office very much preferred the latter," and as a result supported Austria on the one hand in her desire for the establishment of an independent Albania, and on the other in her successful attempts to draw Bulgaria into the second war and to prevent that country from providing the concessions which at that time would have satisfied Rumania.

So far as the first of these questions—that connected with Albania—is concerned, while the ex-Ambassador admits the policy of Austria was actuated by the fact that she "would not allow Serbia to reach the Adriatic," the actual creation of Albania was justified by the existence of the Albanians as a nationality and by their desire for independent government. Indeed, that the régime inaugurated by the great powers on the east

of the Adriatic, and particularly the Government of William of Wied, proved an utter failure, was due not so much to what Prince Lichnowsky describes as the "incapacity of existence" of Albania as to the attitude of the Central Powers, and especially to that of Austria, who, having brought the new State into being, at once worked for unrest and for discord in the hope of being able to step in to put the house in order when the propitious moment arrived.

Promoting Balkan Discord

The second direction in which the enemy devoted his energy was an even larger, more German and more far-reaching one. "The first Balkan war led to the collapse of Turkey and with it the defeat of our policy, which has been identified with Turkey for many years," says the memorandum. This at one time seemed destined to carry with it results entirely disadvantageous to Germany. Thus, if the four States, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia, who fought in the first war had continued on good terms with one another, the whole balance of power in Europe would almost certainly have been changed. Instead of the Ottoman Empire, which prior to the outbreak of these hostilities was held by competent authorities to be able to provide a vast army, then calculated to number approximately 1,225,000 men, there would have sprung up a friendly group of countries which in the near future could easily have placed in the field a combined army approximately amounting to at least 1,000,000, all told. As the interests of such a confederation, which would probably have been joined by Rumania, would have been on the side of the Triple Entente, the Central Powers at once realized that its formation or its continued existence would mean for them not only the loss of the whole of Turkey, but also the gain for their enemies of four or five allies, most of whom had already proved their power in war.

The Kaiser was not then prepared to make war, for his fleet was not ready, his Zeppelins were not perfect, and the enlargement of his Kiel Canal was not complete. While supporting Austria and at the same time exerting restraining influence with her, Germany therefore then contented herself by creating a favorable situation for the future. Thus, the Kaiser, acting still through the mouthpiece of Vienna, encouraged the rivalry which existed between Bulgaria and her former allies—a rivalry which ended in the second Balkan war.

That war, and particularly the fatal Treaty of Bucharest, was temporarily "a reproach

to Austria," but in the long run it was a trump card for Germany in that it led not to a settlement, but simply to the holding in suspense of the numerous Near Eastern questions which had been the means of shaking the European concert to its very foundation. Indeed, that war, together with nominal settlement of the Aegean Islands question, which left Turkey and Greece on the most strained terms, and the entirely unjustifiable shutting off of Serbia from the Adriatic coast left the Near East then still Europe's greatest danger zone. In short, these events created situations as a result of which Germany would be able to bring about war at almost any moment and as a consequence of which the Balkan States were so divided in policy that there would be nothing seriously to bar an enemy push toward the East.

German Power in Turkey

Between the Balkan wars and the outbreak of the European conflagration, but as part of the former period, there occurred two events of far-reaching significance. The first, which is mentioned by Prince Lichnowsky, was the appointment of General Liman von Sanders practically as Commander in Chief of the Turkish Army—an appointment which Mr. Morgenthau rightly tells us constituted a diplomatic triumph for Germany. When coupled with the fact that Enver Pasha—an out-and-out pro-German—became Minister of War about the same time, the military result of this appointment was an enormous improvement in the efficiency of the Ottoman Army. Its political significance, on the other hand, was due to the fact that it carried with it a far-reaching increase of Pan-German influence at Constantinople.

The second event in progress during the interval of peace was connected with the Aegean Islands question. Germany, having first utilized her diplomatic influence in favor of Turkey, later on encouraged the Government of that country in its continued protests against the decision upon that question arrived at by the great powers. Not content, however, with this, the Kaiser, who has now adopted the policy of deportation in Belgium, in Poland, and in Serbia, definitely encouraged the Turks in a like measure in regard to the Greeks of Asia Minor in order to be rid of a hostile and Christian population when the time for action arrived. That this encouragement was given was always apparent to those who followed the course of events in 1914, but that it was admitted by a German Admiral to Mr. Morgenthau constitutes a condemnation the damning nature of which it is difficult to exaggerate.

Prince Lichnowsky as Seen by a Friend

By Baroness Souiny

KARL MAX LICHNOWSKY, sixth Prince of the Principedom of Grätz, Austria, and Kuchelna, Prussia, officer of the highest orders, with a permanent seat in the Prussian House of Lords, is practically a prisoner in his castle, as a result of his outspoken denunciation of German responsibility for the war.

I first met Prince Lichnowsky in Florence, in a little antiquity shop. He had his back turned to me and was deeply engrossed in studying a couple of vases. The storekeeper, a fantastic old Italian, gesticulated violently, his tongue raging like a whirlwind to convince his client of the value of the bargain he was about to close. He asked 800 lire for the vases. Neither of them noticed my presence, and when the Italian stopped his eloquence the other began, in a broken voice and in broken Italian, to fight the price, which was much too high.

I was anxious to see the man's face, after having studied the unusual lines of his head and his fine nervous hands. At last he turned around, and I looked straight into deep gray eyes which, interested only in his purchase, looked through me without seeing me. Both talked at the top of their voices; the storekeeper swore and jumped into the air several times, while the other rubbed his hands, his eyes still on the vases, which he was nearly ready to buy.

I was highly amused and interested, so I took a close view of one of the vases, turning around the better to inspect it. Evidently the gentleman disliked this intensely, and, as if protecting the vases which were so nearly his, he stretched out his hands to them. "It is not worth while," I said in French to him. "It is cheap stuff, although the color is a good imitation." He looked aghast at me, and the storekeeper fumed restlessly when another person entered the little shop, who proved to be a mutual acquaintance of mine and of the buyer. After he had examined the vases the newcomer asked the storekeeper why he was trying to cheat his friend Prince Lichnowsky with a Renaissance imitation. The old man stroked his little white beard in embarrassment, and, then, smiling whimsically, apologized for having taken the Prince for an Englishman.

The incident was closed, and the three of us left the store to walk through the Giardino Boboli. The Prince was still absorbed in his mistake in believing the vases to be genuine.

"We live too far from the really fine things in life," he said, thoughtfully. "We live our life too superficially; we permit ourselves to spend our time in ridiculous office work, which they call diplomacy or politics. Offices are the ruin of political and diplomatic talents; one is born for such a thing, not made."

Only after I knew him better did I understand this temperamental remark. At the time I took it for the discontent of a man whose stomach was weak. I understood that he had left the Diplomatic Service, which had taken him down to one of the Balkan States, at the time when Herr von Bülow, later Chancellor Prince Bülow, was Ambassador there.

Thanks to Lichnowsky, I entered the wonderful salon of von Bülow's wife, who is an Italian, known throughout Italy as "Donna Laura." Lichnowsky belonged to the intimates of this circle, never complaining of the insignificant position which Prince Bülow gave him so long as he had the privilege of association with these high-spirited people who helped him to grasp the profoundest meaning of State ideas.

To understand what made Lichnowsky so different from the Prussian Junkers needs only a simple explanation. He was not a Prussian, nor even a German. He was utterly Slavic, descended from the Bohemian Lichnowskys, who, since the fourteenth century, when Bohemia was a centre of European culture, had their estates in the Czech part of Silesia, which Frederick the Great, in the Seven Years' War, stole from Austria.

It was remarkable what a distinctive atmosphere his home breathed, although it was only in an indifferent apartment house in the Tiergarten Street. When at a visitor's approach the hall door flew open, as if touched by a magic wand, a footman stood at each wing like a sentinel. In the little dining room, with a footman behind each guest at the table, the Prince had served the most delicious luncheons and dinners. The preparations for the meal he considered of great importance, and at the table he noted his criticisms in a little book placed beside his plate. It was a culinary joy to eat with Prince Lichnowsky, but the food never interfered with the intense conversation inspired by the Prince and kept going by his comments.

In his amazing revelations the Prince sarcastically remarked that he did not belong to the inner circle of the Kaiser. I had to smile, remembering his conversations breathing his revolt against junkerdom, narrow-mindedness, and all the faded ideas preached at the castle of his Majesty, which undermine all modern and original movements in art and literature. Painters like Liebermann and originators of new theatrical ideas like Reinhardt belonged to the Lichnowsky circle, and there was no modern thought, no ideas of a free genius, which were not deeply discussed in Prince Lichnowsky's house.

To the great surprise of his friends, Prince Lichnowsky married in August, 1904. His friends at first feared that the unique, refined, and intellectual circle would cease to

be, but they soon found their fears to be groundless. The Prince had found the right wife. Mechtilde, Countess Arco, was fresh as a rose in body and in spirit. She was reared in happy Munich, where aristocracy was no barrier to developing in a wholesome and Bohemian way. This marriage was arranged by Prince Karl's mother, who was anxious that the Lichnowsky line should not be extinguished with her only son. It turned out to be the happiest combination of spirits, and the family tree was continued in two fine boys and a golden-curl'd girl.

More than ever Prince Lichnowsky retired from the political horizon without any tendency to live in the good graces of his Majesty the Kaiser. He was utterly bored with his inherited duties, and he was more interested in the sharp political sarcasms of a Maximilian Harden than in the political and diplomatic blunders committed in the Reichstag.

With all his liberal ideas he was an aristocrat. Though strikingly ugly, this was completely forgotten when he spoke and smiled. He was small and almost deformed, with feet too big, with a grave and heavy carriage, his hands always clasped behind him, and with the excited, high-pitched voice of a boy.

So he sat aside for many years—waiting for a big job, as he always said. Whenever an embassy was vacant, the name of Lichnowsky came up, only to vanish. His appointment was always postponed, for he was not liked on account of his independent spirit and modern ideas.

There was the greatest difference between his two estates at Kuchelna in Prussia and Grätz in Austria, especially in their spirit. Grätz still breathed the easy-going, refined taste of his artistic and musical ancestors. In the castle is a room where Beethoven wrote many of his immortal works; the piano was left untouched as Beethoven had closed it. Those who know the life of Beethoven know that it was a Prince Lichnowsky, the present Prince's grandfather, who was one of the truest and most devoted patrons of the great and unhappy composer. Beethoven dedicated one of his sonatas to him.

No wonder that Beethoven was inspired in the wonderful gardens of Grätz, those endless alleys with blossoming horse chestnuts and sweet-perfumed linden trees, with mysterious high woods behind the lawns, where in the dim light of the first dusk the deer gazed unafraid over the fences. All was wonder and romance around the old castle, and unbounded hospitality was offered to the guests. All was gay and happy there. The servants came from families which had served the

family for centuries. In the guest rooms there was a placard asking the guests not to tip the servants.

The Prince was a thorough farmer—he knew all about cattle, grain, sugar beets, and how to make his estate self-supporting and even money-making.

It was a wonderful free community which always surrounded the Prince in Grätz. In the library of the castle there were the liveliest discussions, a free interchange of ideas.

It was different at Kuchelna. This was the place of the Prince's black thoughts; here the inhabitants of the village looked sullen and subjugated. They never belonged in their hearts to the cold Prussian domination. Here the Prince had to perform his social duties, to give hunting parties arranged for the German aristocracy, his neighbors. To these he had to invite the Court people.

When the day came when he was needed Prince Lichnowsky was well prepared for the responsibility of the London Ambassadorship. Nominated by the Court party as a temporary man, he was greeted by the younger set of politicians with great expectations. He had been trained by the best minds and influenced by the most liberal men, and later he proved to his teachers that he had not only understood them, but had developed in his own way practical ideas which were far ahead of all gray theories.

No wonder that he loved England and that the English understood him. When he says in his revelations that the Kaiser did not wish him to improve the relations between England and Germany and envied him his personal success, it is not vanity which prompts the statement, but a deep understanding of the fact that the Kaiser would not have his relations with England changed unless he himself could accomplish it. Since all the world knew of the antipathy of King Edward for him, the Kaiser wished, through realizing his ambition, to show that King Edward's dislike was personal and unjust and that the English people had no hard feeling toward him.

The last time I saw Prince Lichnowsky was in Berlin. He was on a vacation from London and on his way home. Then the war came, catching so many of us in a country friendly and hospitable yesterday—hard and merciless today. Lichnowsky returned from England and met hostility. He felt that he had never belonged to the German race. His flaming "I Accuse" was poured forth from his oppressed soul. He could not wait for history to justify him and to condemn the Kaiser and his helpers before all mankind for all eternity.

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